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OVERTAXING THE WORKING FAMILY:
UNCLE SAM AND THE CHILDCARE SQUEEZE
Shannon Weeks McCormack*
Today, many working parents are caught in a “childcare squeeze”: while they
require two incomes just to make ends meet, they end up spending a strikingly
large percentage of their income on childcare so that they can work outside the
home. Worse still, some parents find themselves “squeezed out” of the market
entirely, unable to earn the additional income their families require because
they cannot find jobs that pay enough to offset soaring childcare expenses.
This Article argues that the tax laws have played an important role in aggra-
vating these hardships. Currently, the Internal Revenue Code treats the child-
care costs incurred by working parents as personal expenses, subject to various
dollar limitations, percentage limits, and phaseouts. Once these limitations are
applied, working parents will receive tax relief for only a small fraction of the
childcare costs they actually incur. This Article shows that this is inappropriate
as a matter of fundamental tax policy and results in the overtaxation of the
working family. It then provides a blueprint for meaningful reform that would
properly treat working childcare costs like other costs of earning income and
keep the tax laws from worsening the working family’s economic plight.
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Introduction
The economic plight of the working family is worsening. This cry has
been made in the recent campaign speeches of many political candidates,1 by
lawmakers on both sides of the aisle,2 and by the President of the United
1. See, e.g., Laurel Elder & Steven Greene, Politicians Love to Talk About Families. But
Maybe Not Yours., Wash. Post (Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
politicians-love-to-talk-about-family-but-maybe-not-yours/2012/09/07/0be2edea-f218-11e1-a
dc6-87dfa8eff430_story.html [http://perma.cc/79KS-6KVN] (“Odes to families—their values,
their struggles to make ends meet, their efforts to protect their children—have been broadcast
in nearly every political campaign in recent times. Mitt Romney, in his speech accepting the
Republican nomination last month, made the promise ‘to help you and your family’ his cen-
tral message. Obama, in his convention speech, argued that this election will have a huge
impact ‘on our children’s lives for decades.’ And at both conventions combined, ‘families’ was
the fourth-most-mentioned word or phrase, right behind ‘jobs,’ ‘Romney’ and ‘Obama.’ ”).
2. See, e.g., Lauren French & John Bresnahan, House Democrats Outline Agenda, Polit-
ico (July 16, 2014, 11:28 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/07/house-democrats-100-
day-action-plan-nancy-pelosi-108985.html [http://perma.cc/Y7Z3-APP7] (discussing the
“100-day action plan” meant to help the middle class and working families that House Demo-
crats recently released); see also Working Families Flexibility Act of 2013, H.R. 1406, 113th
Cong. (2013) (describing the Working Families Flexibility Act, introduced by Republican Con-
gresswoman Martha Roby, which has passed the U.S. House of Representatives and, as its
name suggests, is meant to provide help to the working family).
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States in more than one State of the Union Address.3 The White House re-
cently hosted a daylong summit devoted to the struggles today’s working
families face,4 which are also chronicled in books,5 op-ed pieces,6 and pro-
posals for legislative reform.7 And current data that confirm there are good
reasons to be concerned about the working family’s continuing ability to
“make ends meet,”8 let alone thrive.9
Childcare expenses represent one of the highest household costs in-
curred by young families in the United States.10 Moreover, although middle-
3. See President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2015), http://www
.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-union-address-january-
20-2015 [http://perma.cc/QW43-F7U4] (“So what does middle-class economics require in our
time? First, middle-class economics means helping working families feel more secure in a
world of constant change. That means helping folks afford childcare, college, health care, a
home, retirement.”); see also President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28,
2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/28/president-barack-obamas-
state-union-address [http://perma.cc/5VQJ-PVMB] (“Over more than three decades, even
before the Great Recession hit, massive shifts in technology and global competition had elimi-
nated a lot of good, middle-class jobs, and weakened the economic foundations that families
depend on.”).
4. On June 23, 2014, the White House, the Department of Labor (DOL) and the Center
for American Progress (CAP), hosted a summit with a special focus on women and their
families. White House Summit on Working Families, http://workingfamiliessummit.org
[http://perma.cc/T3A8-HTSA].
5. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren & Amelia Warren Tyagi, The Two-Income Trap:
Why Middle-Class Mothers and Fathers Are Going Broke (2003) (explaining the eco-
nomic hardships faced by dual-earner couples).
6. See, e.g., Jillian Berman, When Being a Stay-at-Home Mom Isn’t a Choice, Huf-
fington Post (June 30, 2014, 7:32 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/30/stay-at-
home-moms_n_5537503.html [http://perma.cc/73Z4-9G7X]; Belinda Luscombe, Most Stay at
Home Dads Not There by Choice, Time (June 5, 2014), http://time.com/2827314/most-stay-at-
home-dads-not-there-by-choice/ [http://perma.cc/9QEX-XPFD]; Judith Warner, The Opt-Out
Generation Wants Back In, N.Y. Times (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/11/
magazine/the-opt-out-generation-wants-back-in.html [http://perma.cc/YCC8-K7CB].
7. Notably, on February 2, 2015, President Barack Obama released his budget for fiscal
year 2016, asking Congress to help him “bring middle-class economics into the 21st Century,”
and explaining that “middle-class economics means helping working families afford the cor-
nerstones of economic security: child care, college, health care, a home, and retirement.” Presi-
dent Barack Obama, The Budget Message of the President (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www
.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2016/assets/message.pdf [http://perma.cc/
B9ZJ-C8P4]. Additionally, Democratic Senator Kirsten Gillibrand has discussed tax reform as
part of her overall agenda to make childcare more affordable to parents. See Making Childcare
Affordable and Available, Kirsten Gillibrand, http://www.gillibrand.senate.gov/agenda/mak-
ing-childcare-affordable-and-available [http://perma.cc/9T7M-4V9S].
8. White House Summit on Working Families, supra note 4 (“Too many working
Americans—both women and men—are living paycheck to paycheck, struggling to make ends
meet and respond to the competing demands of work and family.”).
9. See, e.g., Sarah Jane Glynn, The New Breadwinners: 2010 Update, Ctr. for Am. Pro-
gress (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/labor/report/2012/04/16/113
77/the-new-breadwinners-2010-update/ [http://perma.cc/45MP-D847] (discussing post-reces-
sion income statistics of the working family).
10. ChildCare Aware of Am., Parents and the High Cost of Childcare 20–23
(2014), http://www.usa.childcareaware.org/advocacy/reports-research/costofcare/ [http://per
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class income levels have been declining for well over a decade,11 the costs of
childcare have consistently climbed.12 Today, most two-parent families con-
sist of two earners and require at least two incomes to meet their needs.13
The pressure to find work is even greater for single parents, who may bear
the primary responsibilities of generating income and caring for their chil-
dren alone. But parents lucky enough to find themselves employed will also
find themselves in the “childcare squeeze,”14 spending a strikingly large per-
centage of their income on childcare to work outside the home.15 Worse still,
ma.cc/8F67-D47N]; see also Tara Siegel Bernard, Choosing Child Care When You Go Back to
Work, N.Y. Times (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/23/your-money/choos-
ing-child-care-when-you-go-back-to-work.html [http://perma.cc/6J67-G5WK].
11. Keith Miller & David Madland, What the New Census Data Show About the Continu-
ing Struggles of the Middle Class, Ctr. for Am. Progress (Sept. 16, 2014), https://www.ameri-
canprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2014/09/16/97203/what-the-new-census-data-show-
about-the-continuing-struggles-of-the-middle-class/ [http://perma.cc/36ED-B7DN]; Rome
Neal, Broke on Two Incomes, CBS News (Sept. 9, 2003, 9:15 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/broke-on-two-incomes/ [http://perma.cc/2FRQ-V4J6]; Alicia Parlapiano et al., The
Shrinking American Middle Class, N.Y. Times (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/inter-
active/2015/01/25/upshot/shrinking-middle-class.html [http://perma.cc/ACK6-K4PX]; Dionne
Searcey & Robert Gebeloff, Middle Class Shrinks Further as More Fall Out Instead of Climbing
Up, N.Y. Times (Jan. 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/26/business/economy/mid-
dle-class-shrinks-further-as-more-fall-out-instead-of-climbing-up.html [http://perma.cc/
A9Tp-DEPH].
12. See Bradford Plumer, The Two-Income Trap, Mother Jones (Nov. 8, 2004, 4:00 AM),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2004/11/two-income-trap [http://perma.cc/796D-
VMDE] (discussing Warren & Tyagi, supra note 5) (“Two-income families are almost always
worse off than their single-income counterparts were a generation ago, even though they pull
in 75 percent more in income. The problem is that so many fixed costs are rising—health care,
child care, finding a good home—that two-income families today actually have less discretion-
ary money left over than those single-earner families did.”).
13. See D’Vera Cohn et al., Pew Research Ctr., After Decades of Decline, a Rise
in Stay-at-Home Mothers 5 (2014), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2014/04/Moms-
At-Home_04-08-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/4YD5-UZGC] (“The share of mothers who do not
work outside the home rose to 29% in 2012, up from a modern-era low of 23% in 1999,
according to a new Pew Research Center analysis of government data.”); see also Glynn, supra
note 9 (“[M]ost children today are growing up in families without a full-time, stay-at-home
caregiver. In 2010, among families with children, nearly half (44.8 percent) were headed by
two working parents and another one in four (26.1 percent) were headed by a single parent. As
a result, fewer than one in three (28.7 percent) children now have a stay-at-home parent,
compared to more than half (52.6 percent) in 1975, only a generation ago.”).
14. See Carol Morello & Scott Clement, “Happy Days” No More: Middle-Class Families
Squeezed as Expenses Soar, Wages Stall, Wash. Post (Apr. 26, 2014), http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/local/happy-days-no-more-middle-class-families-squeezed-as-expenses-soar-
wages-stall/2014/04/26/f4a857f0-7a47-11e3-b1c5-739e63e9c9a7_story.html [http://perma.cc/
4WRL-Z2WK]; David Riley, Many Families Caught in Child Care Squeeze, Democrat &
Chron. (Aug. 11, 2014, 11:35 AM), http://www.democratandchronicle.com/story/news/2014/
08/09/childcare-monroe-county-elaine-spaull/13780719/ [http://perma.cc/HYD9-ZF9J]; Me-
lissa Schorr, The Day Care Squeeze: How Families Cope in the Highest-Priced Child-Care Market
in the Nation, Boston.com (Dec. 12, 2010), http://www.boston.com/lifestyle/articles/2010/12/
12/the_day_care_squeeze/ [http://perma.cc/9GZM-BGU2].
15. See Childcare Aware of Am., supra note 10, at 20–23 (showing childcare as one of
the highest costs in a family’s budget).
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other parents find themselves “squeezed out” of the job market entirely, un-
able to earn the additional income their family requires because they cannot
find jobs that pay enough to offset soaring childcare expenses.16
This Article argues that §§ 21 and 129 of the Internal Revenue Code,
which provide stringently limited tax relief for the costs of childcare in-
curred by working parents, have played an important role in aggravating
these hardships. Currently, the Code treats the childcare costs incurred by
working parents as personal expenses, subject to various dollar limitations,
percentage limits, and phaseouts.17 Once these limitations are applied, work-
ing parents receive tax relief for only a small fraction of the childcare costs
they incur. This Article shows that this is inappropriate as a matter of funda-
mental tax policy and results in the overtaxation of the working family. It
then provides a blueprint for meaningful reform. Specifically, this Article
urges lawmakers to resist the temptation to reform tax laws by simply re-
laxing current limitations, as this would leave parents vulnerable to the same
legislative dysfunction that allowed tax relief for working families to become
so limited in the first place. Instead, this Article asks lawmakers to allow
parents to deduct working childcare costs under the same methods as other
costs of earning income, which are not generally subject to stringent
limitations.
This Article is not the first to notice that the tax laws are stacked against
working parents.18 But previous scholars wrote in a social context in which
one parent generally had the choice to forego work in order to care for her
children19 and the salary of the secondary wage earner—almost always a
woman’s—was discretionary.20 Accordingly, past scholarship has tended to
16. See Berman, supra note 6 (chronicling stories of parents looking for work who only
find jobs offering wages that barely cover childcare costs); see also Cohn et al., supra note 13,
at 6 (“A growing share of stay-at-home mothers (6% in 2012, compared with 1% in 2000) say
they are home with their children because they cannot find a job. With incomes stagnant in
recent years for all but the college-educated, less educated workers in particular may weigh the
cost of child care against wages and decide it makes more economic sense to stay home.”).
17. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 21 (2012).
18. See, e.g., Britten D. Richards, Discrimination Against Married Couples Under Present
Income Tax Laws, 49 Taxes 526 (1971); Kenneth J. White, The Tax Structure and Discrimina-
tion Against Working Wives: A Comment, 26 Nat’l Tax J. 119 (1973).
19. For ease of reading, this Article will use the gender pronouns “him” and “her” to
represent all individuals on the gender spectrum.
20. See Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of
Working Wives and Mothers, 21 Buff. L. Rev. 49, 49 (1971) (“The Code will be examined in its
current social context. Thus, the observation that American working wives are predominantly
secondary family earners is not intended to express a social ideal. It merely reflects a contem-
porary social reality. Women workers generally earn substantially less than their male counter-
parts. Working wives earn less than their employed husbands. The American wife’s working
career is likely to be broken by child-bearing and rearing. Unless prompted by economic ne-
cessity, her return to work is generally considered discretionary. Even when she is earning a
substantial salary, her husband is unlikely to view his employment as discretionary.” (foot-
notes omitted)); see also Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 Stan. L.
Rev. 1389, 1433 (1975) (“These burdens on the two-job married couple are often castigated as
a deterrent to the employment of married women outside the home. In theory, of course, the
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focus on how the tax laws provide disincentives for married women to enter
the workforce and has proposed reforms designed to create more desirable
behavioral incentives.21 These conversations, however, are increasingly off
target. Today, two-parent families can rarely afford to have one parent stay
home to provide childcare, a luxury that single parents are even less likely to
enjoy. This Article, therefore, stands poised to be the first academic piece to
critically address how a reformed tax system should tax the modern working
family.
Part I of this Article describes how Internal Revenue Code §§ 21 and
129 severely limit the ability of working parents to reduce their taxable in-
come to reflect today’s high childcare costs. Part II discusses the basic princi-
ples of tax law that govern whether a taxpayer should be able to reduce her
tax liability to reflect a particular expenditure. Applying these principles,
Part III argues that working childcare costs should be treated primarily, if
not entirely, as nonconsumptive expenses, justifying a tax reduction for at
least almost the entire cost. Because current law mistreats childcare expenses
as consumptive personal costs, Part IV urges lawmakers to reform the tax
laws by properly treating working childcare expenses like other noncon-
sumptive costs of earning income. Part V concludes that while the tax laws
cannot (and should not) solve all problems facing today’s working family,
the reforms this Article proposes would help prevent overtaxing working
families and at least ease their economic struggles.
I. Current Law: The Limited Tax Relief Provided
to Working Families
There are several mechanisms by which the Internal Revenue Code al-
lows a taxpayer to reduce her tax liability, providing some degree of tax
relief. For instance, some provisions of the Code allow a taxpayer to deduct
expenses she has incurred from her taxable income or credit them against
burden arises whether the ‘secondary’ wage-earner is the husband or the wife, and hence falls
on the couple jointly. In a society that takes the husband’s job for granted and views the wife
as the secondary wage earner, however, it is reasonable to describe the existing state of affairs
as biased against women.”).
21. See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 20, at 1433; Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Fam-
ily: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 983, 987 (1993)
(“[T]he Article explores how the tax laws provide behavioral incentives that affect three types
of decisions: whether to marry, whether to form a one- or a two-earner household, and
whether to work full or part time.”); Margaret Ryznar, To Work, or Not to Work? The Immortal
Tax Disincentives for Married Women, 13 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 921, 921 (2009) (“Among the
most fundamental barriers to the aggressive participation of many married women in the
work force are the disincentives for secondary income earners embedded in the federal tax
code.”); Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 Geo. L.J. 1571, 1573 (1996) (“The market-
oriented approach to women’s equality and liberation acknowledges the material costs associ-
ated with performing unpaid labor and the role it plays in preventing women from obtaining
the level of wages and benefits that men receive in the market. To remedy this problem, the
market-oriented scholars have devised practical solutions that would, in effect, provide women
with greater returns on their market labor.”).
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her tax liability.22 Other provisions provide exemptions by allowing taxpay-
ers to exclude from their taxable income amounts or benefits that would
otherwise be included in income and subject to taxation.23
Currently, the law provides very limited tax relief for the costs of caring
for one’s dependents, including children (the focus of this Article) as well as
the elderly and disabled.24 The available tax relief can be separated into relief
for two categories of costs: relief for childcare expenses that enable taxpayer
parents to work (“working childcare costs”) and relief for child-related ex-
penses that are not associated with income production (“nonworking child-
care costs”). Part II further explains the significance of this. After discussing
the various tax provisions, which provide relief for these different costs, this
Part shows that the Code currently allows tax relief for only a fraction of the
childcare costs working parents can be expected to incur.
A. Tax Relief for Nonworking Childcare Expenses
Sections 151 and 24 of the Internal Revenue Code allow a parent to
reduce her tax liability by set amounts that reflect a portion of the costs she
can be expected to incur to care for her children. The availability of the relief
these provisions offer is not tied to whether parents incur these expenses
while working; nor is it tied to whether parents work at all. Instead, these
provisions allow taxpayer parents to make downward adjustments to their
income tax liability to reflect the inevitable costs of child rearing, which
taxpayers without parental obligations do not incur.25
22. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 162.
23. See, e.g., id. § 129. For the tax novice, if a specific code provision allows a taxpayer to
deduct an expense, that taxpayer may subtract the cost from her taxable income. Suppose, for
instance, that a taxpayer earned $100,000 gross income this year and incurred $6,000 deducti-
ble expenses. After the deduction, the taxpayer would be able to reduce her income from
$100,000 to $94,000. An exemption, on the other hand, allows a taxpayer to exclude from her
taxable income items that would otherwise be includible. Thus, suppose the taxpayer earned
$100,000 gross income this year, consisting of $94,000 of cash and $6,000 of noncash benefits
(such as healthcare, childcare, etc.). Generally, a taxpayer must include in income the fair
market value of benefits received and thus, in this scenario, the taxpayer would, as a general
matter, have taxable income equal to $100,000. If, however, a provision of the Internal Reve-
nue Code allowed the taxpayer to exclude the benefits—put another way, these benefits were
exempt from taxation—the taxpayer would have to include only $94,000 in her taxable in-
come. A tax credit provides a dollar-for-dollar reduction of a taxpayer’s tax liability. Contrast
this with a deduction, which instead reduces one’s taxable income—the amount on which
relevant tax rates are applied to determine final tax liability.
24. See id. § 152 (defining dependents).
25. Put another way, these sections reflect the judgment that if two taxpayers earn the
same income but only one cares for dependent children, the caretaker should have a lower tax
liability to reflect these costs. This Article does not cover the Earned Income Tax Credit, which
allows taxpayers to take a dollar-for-dollar credit if their adjusted gross income is below a
certain threshold. Both the applicable threshold and credit increase as the number of children
dependent on the taxpayer increases.
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As a default matter, § 151 allows a taxpayer to exclude from her taxable
income a personal-dependency exemption amount,26 which is $4,000 for the
2015 tax year.27 A married couple filing jointly is entitled to claim two per-
sonal-dependency exemptions (one for each spouse) and an additional per-
sonal exemption for each of the couple’s dependents.28 A single parent with
full custody of his two children would claim three personal exemptions on
his income taxes.29
Section 151 helps to define a minimum level of income below which no
taxation will be levied. To illustrate, § 151 initially allows a childless couple
filing jointly to exclude $8,000 from its taxable income, and a married
couple with two children to exclude $16,000. Thus, if the former and latter
couples were to earn less than $8,000 or $16,000, respectively, they would
have no taxable income once they had claimed the personal exemptions to
which they were entitled.
Of course, § 151 will not completely eliminate the tax liability of all
taxpayers, but may still reduce that liability to a significant extent. For in-
stance, a married couple without children that earned $100,000 taxable in-
come in 2015 would, after claiming exemptions, pay taxes on $92,000,
resulting in a $14,587 tax liability30; a married couple with two children
earning the same $100,000 would only pay tax on $84,000, resulting in a
$12,587 tax liability.31
The personal-dependency exemption amount “phases out” for taxpayers
at even higher income levels—that is, taxpayers begin to lose a percentage of
the exemption amount once their earnings surpass a designated threshold,
and they lose a greater percentage of the exemption as income rises past that
amount.32 In 2015, a married couple filing jointly begins to lose a percentage
of its exemption amount once the couple’s combined income reaches
$309,900, and it will lose the entire exemption amount once its income ex-
ceeds $432,400.33 A single parent filing as a head of household will begin to
lose the benefit of the personal-dependency exemption once income reaches
$284,050 and will lose the entire exemption once income reaches $406,550.34
26. I.R.C. § 151(b)–(c).
27. Rev. Proc. 2014-61, 2014-47 I.R.B. 860, 866, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb14-47
.pdf [http://perma.cc/9ZDP-LPVZ].
28. I.R.C. § 151.
29. See id. § 152(c)(4)(B) (allowing exemption for custodial parent).
30. See id. § 1(a); Rev. Proc. 2014-61, 2014-47 I.R.B. 860, 861. All hypotheticals assume
all income is ordinary income, unless otherwise stated.
31. See sources cited supra note 30.
32. See Rev. Proc. 2014-61, 2014-47 I.R.B. 860, 866.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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A single parent filing as unmarried will begin to lose the benefit once in-
come reaches $258,250 and will lose the entire exemption once income
reaches $380,750.35
In 1997, Congress added § 24 to the Code to supplement the tax relief
provided to families by § 151.36 Before phaseouts, current § 24 allows tax-
payers to claim a $1,000 “child tax credit”—that is, a $1,000 reduction in the
taxpayer’s tax liability37—for each dependent child.38 Building on the exam-
ple above, the childless couple earning $100,000 would have a $14,587 tax
liability while the couple with two children would have a tax liability of
$12,587 less $2,000, or $10,587.
Like § 151’s personal-dependency exemption, § 24’s child tax credit
phases out for taxpayers at higher income levels; but the child tax credit
phases out far more quickly. In 2015, for instance, a married couple filing
jointly begins to lose a portion of the credit once income rises above
$110,000, and it loses the credit completely once income exceeds $130,000.39
A single parent begins to lose a portion of the credit once income exceeds
$75,000, and she loses the credit completely once income exceeds $95,000.40
The purpose of §§ 151 and 24 is to “reduce the individual income tax
burden of . . . families [and] . . . better recognize the financial responsibili-
ties of raising dependent children.”41 The availability of the tax relief pro-
vided by these sections is not tied to actual expenses incurred and does not
depend on whether the expenses are related to the caregiver’s work. A differ-
ent pair of Code sections provides relief to taxpayers who incur childcare
costs, which enables them to earn income. As discussed further in Part II,
this distinction between nonworking and working childcare expenses is cru-
cial, and providing tax relief for these two types of costs should be viewed as
serving entirely distinct purposes.
35. Id.; see also IRS, Publication 501, Exemptions, Standard Deduction, and Filing
Information 8 (2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p501.pdf [http://perma.cc/T264-
B93K] (indicating when a single parent may file for head of household).
36. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 101(a), 111 Stat. 788, 796 (codified
as amended at I.R.C. § 24(a) (2012)). In the legislative history of the original version of the bill
passed by the House, lawmakers stated:
The Committee believes that the individual income tax structure does not reduce tax
liability by enough to reflect a family’s reduced ability to pay taxes as family size in-
creases. In part, this is because over the last 50 years the value of the dependent personal
exemption has declined in real terms by over one-third. The Committee believes that a
tax credit for families with dependent children will reduce the individual income tax
burden of those families, will better recognize the financial responsibilities of raising de-
pendent children, and will promote family values.
H.R. Rep. No. 105-148, at 309–10 (1997).
37. I.R.C. § 24(a) (2012). The original version of § 24 allowed a $500 credit per child.
§ 101(a), 111 Stat. at 796.
38. I.R.C. § 24(c) defines “qualifying child.”
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. H.R. Rep. No. 105-148, at 309–10.
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B. Tax Relief for Working Childcare Expenses
Section 21 of the Internal Revenue Code allows a taxpayer to reduce her
taxable income to reflect childcare expenses that “enable [her] to be gain-
fully employed.”42 The original version of § 21, enacted in 1954, allowed
some taxpayers to deduct up to $600 of these working childcare expenses.43
By 1971, the maximum deduction allowed by any taxpayer was $4,800.44 To
illustrate, suppose that the Smiths (married and filing jointly) earned
$100,000. Imagine also that the Smiths both work and have two very small
boys. Therefore, they spend $3,000 per year for day care. The 1971 version of
§ 21 allowed the Smiths to reduce their taxable income from $100,000 to
$97,000. If the Smiths were in a 30% marginal tax bracket, meaning the rate
at which the taxpayer’s next dollar of income would be taxed, this would
result in a tax savings of $900 (the product of 30% and the $3,000 reduction
in taxable income).
Congress, however, was disturbed by the “upside-down-subsidy effect”
created by the original § 21.45 That is, because the tax relief for working
childcare expenses took the form of a deduction, wealthier taxpayers bene-
fited more than the less well off. In the example above, the Smiths saved
$900 in income taxes as a result of the original § 21 deduction because they
earned enough to put them in a 30% marginal tax bracket. Suppose, how-
ever, that the Smiths only earned enough to be in a 20% marginal tax
bracket but still incurred $3,000 in working childcare expenses. In this case,
the tax savings from the original § 21’s deduction would be reduced to $600
(the product of 20% and $3,000), resulting in the upside-down-subsidy
effect.
The Code provides for many deductions, each of which, as a matter of
mathematics, inevitably results in this upside-down-subsidy effect. Congress,
however, was apparently particularly disturbed by this effect in the context
42. I.R.C. § 21(b)(2)(A) defines employment-related expenses as:
amounts paid for the following expenses, but only if such expenses are incurred to enable
the taxpayer to be gainfully employed for any period for which there are 1 or more
qualifying individuals with respect to the taxpayer:
(i) expenses for household services, and
(ii) expenses for the care of a qualifying individual.
Such term shall not include any amount paid for services outside the taxpayer’s house-
hold at a camp where the qualifying individual stays overnight.
I.R.C. § 21(b)(2)(A).
43. H.R. Rep. No. 83-1337, at A61 (1954). For a full discussion of the early history of
then-section 214 see Alan L. Feld, Deductibility of Expenses for Child Care and Household Ser-
vices: New Section 214, 27 Tax L. Rev. 415 (1972).
44. I.R.C. § 214(c) (1971) (repealed 1976); S. Rep. No. 94-1236, at 48–51 (1976).
45. See S. Rep. No. 94-938, at 132–33 (1976).
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of the childcare deduction. Initially, Congress attempted to mitigate this ef-
fect by phasing down the deductible expenses allowed as the taxpayer’s in-
come rose.46 But in 1976, Congress responded more directly to the perceived
upside-down-subsidy problem and amended § 21, replacing the deduction
with a tax credit for a percentage of working childcare expenses.47 The 1976
version of § 21 allowed a taxpayer to claim a credit equal to 20% of childcare
expenses that enabled her to be gainfully employed.48 Thus, all taxpayers
incurring $3,000 of working childcare expenses (such as the Smiths) could
subtract $600 from their tax bill. The original credit, therefore, eliminated
the upside-down-subsidy effect created by § 21’s original deduction by al-
lowing all taxpayers to reduce their taxable income by the same percentage
of working childcare costs.
In changing the working childcare deduction to a credit, Congress ex-
plicitly rejected income-based “phaseouts.”49 First, Congress believed the
phaseout was no longer necessary since the upside-down-subsidy effect of
the deduction was eliminated.50 Further, Congress thought the phaseout in-
appropriate because working childcare expenses were “cost[s] of earning in-
come”51 and, therefore, not the type of expenses that should ever be subject
to phaseouts, a concept that the Article discusses further at Part IV.52
Nevertheless, in 1981, perhaps having lost sight of § 21’s history, Con-
gress amended that provision to include income phaseouts.53 Currently, a
taxpayer—for example, a married couple filing jointly with children, or a
single custodial parent—may deduct 35% of working childcare expenses if
the taxpayer earns $15,000 or less.54 Once the taxpayer’s income rises above
the $15,000 threshold, the percentage of creditable working childcare ex-
penses is reduced. Taxpayers earning over $43,000 may credit only 20% of
46. Specifically, the maximum $4,800 deduction was reduced by one dollar for every two
dollars a taxpayer’s income exceeded $35,000. Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 94th
Cong., Summary of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 (H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., Public Law
94-455) 20–21 (Comm. Print. 1976).
47. Id.
48. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 504(a)(1), 90 Stat. 1520, 1563.
49. S. Rep. No. 94-938, at 133 (“The committee views qualified child care expenses as a
cost of earning income and believes that an income ceiling on those entitled to the allowance
has minimal revenue impact, if the allowance is in the form of a credit. Therefore, it considers
it appropriate and feasible to eliminate the income phaseout and to allow all taxpayers to claim
such expenses regardless of their income level.”).
50. Id. at 132 (“One method for extending the allowance of child care expenses to all
taxpayers, and not just to itemizers, would be to replace the itemized deduction with a credit
against income tax liability for a percentage of qualified expenses. While deductions favor
taxpayers in the higher marginal tax brackets, a tax credit provides more help for taxpayers in
the lower brackets.”).
51. Id. (“The committee believes that [working childcare] expenses should be viewed as a
cost of earning income for which all working taxpayers may make a claim.”).
52. See infra Section IV.A.
53. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172, 198.
54. I.R.C. § 21(a)(2) (2012).
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these expenses and the percentage remains at 20% for all income levels ex-
ceeding this threshold.55 Considering that in 2014, the poverty level for a
family with two children was $23,850,56 these phaseouts are extremely steep.
Further, § 21 was soon amended to include dollar limitations. Cur-
rently, creditable working childcare expenses are limited to $3,000 for one
child and $6,000 for two or more children.57 Thus, the maximum credit
allowed for all taxpayers earning over $43,000 is $1,200 (20% of $6,000). If a
taxpayer’s marginal tax rate is 30%, this equates to a $4,000 deduction, com-
pared to the $4,800 deduction allowed by the 1971 version of § 21.58 Con-
gress has, therefore, not only failed to adjust § 21 for inflation—the dollar
limitations found in § 21 have not been changed for well over a decade59—
but has also allowed today’s version of § 21 to provide working families with
a non-indexed dollar tax savings that is less than the non-indexed savings
allowed four decades ago. It is, therefore, not particularly surprising that
§ 21 allows working families tax relief for only a small fraction of the child-
care costs they actually incur. Part II explores this reality in greater detail.
Before proceeding to that discussion, however, an additional section of
the Code provides another method parents may use to reduce their taxable
income to reflect working childcare costs. In 1981, Congress added what is
now § 129 to the Code.60 While § 21 provides tax relief to taxpayers who
directly incur working childcare expenses, § 129 provides tax relief to tax-
payers who, as a result of their employment, receive childcare services or
other benefits that lessen the costs of childcare.61
For instance, an employer might provide its employees on-site day care
for free or at a discounted cost. Ordinarily, the fair-market value of those
services (or the value of the discount) would be included in the taxpayer’s
income.62 Section 129, however, allows taxpayers to exclude up to $5,000
55. See id.
56. 2014 Poverty Guidelines, 79 Fed. Reg. 3593, 3593 (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.gpo
.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-01-22/pdf/2014-01303.pdf [http://perma.cc/K5NQ-CNQA].
57. I.R.C. § 21(c).
58. A deduction reduces a taxpayer’s taxable income, which is then used to calculate the
taxpayer’s tax liability using applicable tax rates. If a taxpayer is in a 30% marginal tax rate—
that is, his next dollar of income will be taxed at a rate of 30%—a $4,000 reduction in his
taxable income will result in a tax savings of $1,200 (30% of the $4,000). Thus, a $1,200 credit
(which provides a dollar-for-dollar reduction from tax liability) produces the same tax savings
as a $4,000 deduction.
59. In 2001, the limits were adjusted to their current levels. See Economic Growth and
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38, 49.
60. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172, 199–200 (codi-
fied as amended at I.R.C. § 129).
61. Compare I.R.C. § 21, with I.R.C. § 129.
62. 26 C.F.R. § 1.61-2(d)(1) (2015) (“If services are paid for in exchange for other ser-
vices, the fair market value of such other services taken in payment must be included in in-
come as compensation.”).
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worth of employer-provided dependent-care assistance—for example, em-
ployer-provided childcare—from their taxable income.63 Section 129 also al-
lows an employer to establish dependent-care flexible-spending accounts
(FSAs), into which employees may divert up to $5,000 of their earnings free
from taxation, so long as those funds are used to cover working childcare
costs.64
To illustrate, recall the Smith family discussed above. Suppose that
rather than paying $3,000 directly to their sons’ day care, the Smiths decide
to take advantage of their employer’s dependent-care flexible-spending plan
and set aside $3,000 of their $30,000 earnings. Section 129 allows the Smiths
to exclude that “earmarked” $3,000, reducing their taxable income to
$27,000. If the Smiths are in a 30% marginal tax bracket, this results in a
$900 tax savings (the product of 30% and $3,000).
Unlike § 21, § 129 does not provide phaseouts and does not change dol-
lar limitations based on number of children. But like § 21, the dollar limita-
tions provided in § 129 are likely to represent only a small fraction of the
childcare costs incurred by working families.
Several things are worth noting before discussing the currently high cost
of childcare. First, § 129 inevitably results in the upside-down-subsidy effect
Congress attempted to eliminate in 1976 when it changed the mechanism of
tax relief provided in § 21 from a deduction to a percentage credit.65 While
the Smiths, who are presumptively in a 30% marginal tax bracket, will enjoy
$900 in tax savings as a result of excluding the $3,000 set aside in the depen-
dent-care FSA, a taxpayer who earns only enough to be in a 20% marginal
tax bracket will enjoy a lesser $600 savings from setting aside the same
amount.
Second, together §§ 21 and 129 create an odd situation in which two
taxpayers in identical economic situations are taxed differently.66  Using cur-
rent § 21’s phaseouts, when the Smiths paid for day care directly, they could
claim a credit equal to 20% of their $3,000 expenses, reducing their tax lia-
bility by $600.  If, however, they decided to use a dependent-care FSA to pay
the $3,000, they would reduce their tax liability by $900 as a result of § 129’s
exclusion. Whether it is preferable to pay for working childcare expenses
directly (so that one may claim the § 21 credit) or to use a dependent-care
FSA (so that one may claim the § 129 exclusion) depends, among other
things, on one’s marginal tax bracket. To the extent that taxpayers can
choose how to fund childcare, this is at best silly and at worst a trap for the
unwary. The situation is more troubling, however, since some taxpayers may
63. I.R.C. § 129(a)(2)(A). See infra notes 209–223 and accompanying text for a more
detailed illustration that shows, among other things, that some taxpayers may be entitled to
both a § 129 exclusion and § 21 credit. This additional detail does not affect the substantive
points of this Section.
64. IRS, Instructions for Form 2441: Child and Dependent Care Expenses (2014),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i2441.pdf [http://perma.cc/7DQJ-ZMMC].
65. See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text.
66. See infra Section IV.B for a more detailed illustration.
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not work for employers that have established dependent-care FSAs. Never-
theless, the discrepant treatment of economically identical taxpayers is una-
voidable so long as the Code uses different mechanisms to provide tax relief
in §§ 21 and 129—that is, a phased-out percentage credit and an exclusion
from taxable income.
Finally, and of critical import for the analysis of this Article, the hypo-
thetical above illustrates that § 21’s working childcare credit and § 129’s ex-
clusion for income diverted to a dependent-care FSA (hereinafter the FSA
exclusion) should be analyzed in exactly the same manner. There is no eco-
nomic difference between a taxpayer directly paying her caregiver and a tax-
payer diverting amounts to a dependent-care FSA, which is then used to pay
that caregiver. While the Code currently uses two different mechanisms to
provide tax relief for these economically identical transactions—namely, a
credit for the former transaction and exclusion in the latter—there is no
reason why these transactions should not be taxed the same. Thus, if one
were to conclude that § 21’s credit does not offer adequate tax relief for
working families, one would also need to apply that reasoning to determine
the adequacy of the FSA exclusion allowed by § 129. In light of this, the
remainder of this Article will refer collectively to § 21’s percentage credit
and § 129’s FSA exclusion as the working childcare provisions and to the
relief provided by those sections—that is, the percentage credit and FSA
exclusion—as working childcare relief.67
C. The Reality Faced by Working Families: What Is the Effect (or Lack
Thereof) of the Working Childcare Provisions?
Just as all families look different from one another, the ways in which
families earn income and care for their children vary dramatically. In two-
parent families, one parent may earn all of the income while the other pro-
vides childcare; alternatively, both parents may work. But the dual-earner
family is extremely likely to incur significant additional expenses to provide
childcare during working hours, especially in families with preschool-aged
children.68 And the significance of these expenses magnifies for single par-
ents, who may alone bear the primary responsibilities of producing income
and caring for their children.
67. Section 129 also allows taxpayers to exclude from their taxable income up to $5,000
worth of childcare services provided by their employers—for example, day care provided by an
employer. I.R.C. § 129(a)(2)(A). I do not see any reason why the analysis of this Article would
not also extend to the exclusion of these in-kind benefits.
68. Census data shows that in families in which the mother is employed and children are
younger than five years of age, roughly 88 percent of families require some regular childcare.
See Lynda Laughlin, U.S. Census Bureau, No. P70-135, Who’s Minding the Kids? Child
Care Arrangements: Spring 2011, at 5 (2013), http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/
library/publications/2013/demo/p70-135.pdf [http://perma.cc/QW8A-W88Z] (“In the spring
of 2011, 88 percent of the 10.9 million preschoolers of employed mothers . . . were in at least
one child care arrangement on a regular basis.”).
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Childcare is very costly in the United States and represents one of the
highest household costs families incur. 69 Childcare “often exceeds the cost
of housing, college tuition, transportation or food.” And these expenses tend
to be incurred “at a time when families can least afford them.” 70
The cost of childcare varies significantly by state71 and by whether the
care is provided in an urban or rural environment, with the former being far
costlier.72 The cost also depends greatly on the age of the children; care for
infants and preschool-aged children is appreciably more expensive than care
for school-aged children.73
One of the most common options available to working parents is the
“child care center,”74 a day-care facility defined formally by a leading study
on childcare costs as “[a]n early care and education facility that is licensed/
licensed exempt by the state and operates under a proprietary or not-for-
profit status, independently, or as part of a large chain of facilities or a faith-
based organization.”75 In the ten most expensive states, the cost of caring for
one infant—that is, a child under one year of age—in a childcare center
ranged from $10,787 to $14,508 per year, representing between 47.1% and
56.0% of the median salary of a single parent in those states, and between
13.8% and 15.9% of the median salary of a married couple.76 In Washington
D.C., the cost of similar care is $21,948, representing a staggering 83.4% of
the median salary of a single parent in the District77 and a still-high 13.5% of
the median salary of couples.
And that is just for one child. In New York, the state with the highest
cost of childcare by reference to median salary, parents pay $26,788 per year
to provide care for an infant and preschool-aged child in a childcare center.78
In Washington State and Minnesota, a day-care center for two young chil-
dren costs over $21,000 and $24,000, respectively.79 In Washington, D.C.,
parents with two preschool-aged children pay the highest costs in the coun-
try—around $34,000.80 Even in the most affordable states, care in a childcare
69. Childcare Aware of Am., supra note 10; see also Bernard, supra note 10.
70. Childcare Aware of Am., supra note 10, at 4 (quoting Lynette M. Fraga, Executive
Director, Childcare Aware of America).
71. Id. at 14.
72. See id.
73. Id. apps. 2–4 at 42–47.
74. Approximately 25 percent of childcare arrangements for children under five are made
through childcare centers. Laughlin, supra note 68, at 9 tbl.3. This represents, by far, the
largest percentage of nonrelative arrangements.
75. ChildCare Aware of Am., supra note 10, at 39.
76. Id. at 16 tbl.2.
77. Id. app. 2 at 42. The unusual figures for the District of Columbia are because it is an
exclusively urban area, with large income disparities between single-parent and two-parent
families. Id. at 19.
78. See id. app. 1 at 40.
79. See id. app. 1 at 40–41.
80. See id. app. 3 at 44.
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center costs slightly over $10,000 for an infant and a toddler, and prices
range between these points in other states.81
Of course, “child care centers” are not the only form of childcare,
though they are the most common form of paid care.82 Popular mostly in
rural areas, “family child care homes”—that is, “[c]hild care offered in a
caregiver’s own home [that], depending on the state’s licensing regulations,
may be licensed or exempt from licensing”—carries with it lower costs than
day-care arrangements.83
It is also common for working parents to hire a “nanny,” an individual
who will provide care for children in the home of the parent, a friend, or a
neighbor.84 This option is often more expensive than the childcare center.
One recent report estimates that parents pay around $37,000 per year for a
full-time nanny.85 This estimate is a logical one. Suppose a dual-earner
couple or single parent works forty hours each week and therefore needs
care for forty-five hours each week to account for commuting time. Even if
parents paid the caregiver $10 an hour, since five hours would be considered
overtime and payable at time and a half,86 the caregiver’s yearly salary would
be $24,700. In reality, an individual caregiver caring for two children will
(and should) require much more than $10 per hour, which is barely the
minimum wage in many states.87 If parents paid an individual caregiver $15
per hour, for instance, her salary would be well over $35,000.
There are various reasons why parents might choose or need to use this
more expensive option. The wait-lists at many day-care facilities are notori-
ously long.88 Further, day-care facilities will often refuse care for infants89
81. See id. apps. 2–3 at 42–45.
82. Laughlin, supra note 68, at 9 tbl.3.
83. ChildCare Aware of Am., supra note 10, at 39.
84. Nanny care provided either in a parent’s home or the nanny’s home is a popular paid
childcare option, representing 12.9 percent of arrangements. Laughlin, supra note 68, at 9
tbl.3.
85. Hannah Seligson, The True Cost of Leaning In, Daily Beast (Mar. 22, 2013, 4:45
AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/03/22/the-true-cost-of-leaning-in.html
[http://perma.cc/JW2Z-7B85].
86. Overtime Pay, U.S. Dep’t Lab., http://www.dol.gov/whd/overtime_pay.htm [http://
perma.cc/YD46-MDWX].
87. See Minimum Wage Laws in the States—January 1, 2015, U.S. Dep’t Lab., http://www
.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm [http://perma.cc/5ACC-ZSJZ]. In Washington State, the
minimum wage is $9.47. Minimum Wage, Wash. St. Dep’t Lab. & Industries, http://www
.lni.wa.gov/WORKPLACERIGHTS/WAGES/MINIMUM/DEFAULT.ASP [http://perma.cc/
5RZL-UH76 ].
88. Sue Shellenbarger, Day Care? Take a Number, Baby, Wall Street J. (June 9, 2010,
12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704256604575294523680479314
[http://perma.cc/HWL6-GF2S]; see also Alissa Quart, Opinion, Crushed by the Cost of Child
Care, N.Y. Times (Aug. 17, 2013, 2:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/17/
crushed-by-the-cost-of-child-care/ [http://perma.cc/LX9Q-VFTM] (“Among the mothers I
spoke to, one . . . signed up for a slot at a local day care when she was newly pregnant. Her
daughter is now 5, and she is still on the wait list.”).
89. See Shellenbarger, supra note 88. This is likely due, at least in significant part, to
more stringent limitations being placed on infant-care facilities (as opposed to facilities that
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and almost all (if not all) facilities will not care for ill children.90 Considering
how frequently small children are sick—the average child will catch any-
where from six to ten colds each year91—parents using day-care options will
often need to miss (or be late to) work to tend to their sick children.92 In
fact, one study that chronicled cases in which parents were fired for missing
or being tardy to work because they were caring for their ill children con-
cluded that many parents are only “one sick child away from being fired.”93
An individual caretaker, by contrast, can provide care even when children
are ill. Finally, parents may simply feel more comfortable having one indi-
vidual care for their children in a home environment, rather than transport-
ing children to what might be seen as a more impersonal setting with
rotating caregivers.
What this data make clear is that the relief provided by § 21 and 129
does not do much to relieve working parents of the financial burdens of
childcare. The percentage credit in § 21 and the FSA exclusion in § 129 al-
low parents to credit or exclude a mere fraction of the costs actually incurred
for employment-related childcare. Furthermore, this data makes clear that
§ 21’s phaseouts are astonishingly steep. The relief provided by § 21 begins
to phase out once a parent’s income exceeds $15,000.94 In many states, this
falls short—often far short—of the amount needed just to provide care for
two young children while working full-time hours.95 Furthermore, the per-
centage credit phases down to its lowest level of 20 percent of childcare costs
(subject to dollar limitations) once a taxpayer’s income reaches $43,000.96 In
Washington, D.C., the cost of caring for an infant and a four year old in a
care only for older children) that wish to maintain their state certifications. For instance,
legally required infant-to-caregiver ratios are far lower than the noninfant-to-caregiver ratios.
E.g., Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., Div. of Child Care & Early Childhood Educ., Mini-
mum Licensing Requirements for Child Care Centers 22 (rev. 2015), http://humanservi
ces.arkansas.gov/dccece/licensing_docs/2014%20A1%20CCC%20Clean%20Copy%20Final%
20Filing.pdf [http://perma.cc/MME5-YG6X] (requiring infant-to-caregiver ratio of 1:6 for in-
fants less than eighteen months; 1:9 for children between eighteen and thirty-six months; 1:12
for ages two-and-a-half through three years; 1:15 for four years; 1:18 for five years to kinder-
garten; and 1:20 for kindergarten and above).
90. Julie Revelant, Too Sick for Daycare? Experts Weigh In, Fox News (Sept. 5, 2012),
http://www.foxnews.com/health/2012/09/04/too-sick-for-day-care-experts-weigh-in/ [http://
perma.cc/MGN9-CT3L] (“Most daycare centers have a sick child policy which outlines when
kids should stay home. And although it’s not always feasible to take a day off of work, it’s a
good idea to take into account the other children as well.”).
91. Id.; see also Joan C. Williams, Work Life Law, UC Hastings Coll. of the Law,
One Sick Child Away from Being Fired: When “Opting Out” Is Not an Option 12
(2006) http://www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/onesickchild.pdf [http://perma.cc/NT2K-4USY]
(“Routine childhood illness is a major concern.”).
92. See Williams, supra note 91, at 12–13.
93. Id. at 3, 5.
94. I.R.C. § 21(a)(2) (2012).
95. See supra notes 76–81 and accompanying text.
96. See I.R.C. § 21(a)(2).
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childcare center is $39,252,97 let alone the cost of an individual caretaker,
which may be even higher.98
The situation should be taken seriously. As noted in the Introduction,
most two-parent families are made up of two earners and require at least
two incomes.99 Single parents face even greater pressure to find work to ade-
quately care for their children. And, although middle-class incomes have
generally decreased in recent decades,100 the costs of childcare have steadily
risen.101 As a result, many working parents are in a “childcare squeeze,”
spending a significant portion of their earnings on childcare to simply make
it possible for them to work.102
Even worse, recent data suggest that more parents are finding themselves
“squeezed out” of the market completely because they cannot find jobs that
pay enough to offset soaring childcare expenses. According to a study con-
ducted by the Pew Research Center, the percentage of stay-at-home mothers
started to decline in the mid-1960s and continued to do so until it reached
an all-time low of 23 percent in 1999.103 But the percentage of stay-at-home
mothers started to rise in 1999 and has climbed ever since, representing a
“reversal of a long-term decline in ‘stay-at-home’ mothers that had persisted
for the last three decades of the 20th century.”104 Unfortunately, many of
these parents are not staying home by choice,105 but because they have found
that potential wages would barely cover childcare costs.106
97. ChildCare Aware of Am., supra note 10, apps. 2–3.
98. See supra notes 85–87 and accompanying text.
99. See Glynn, supra note 9, at 2 (“[M]ost children today are growing up in families
without a full-time, stay-at-home caregiver. In 2010, among families with children, nearly half
(44.8 percent) were headed by two working parents and another one in four (26.1 percent)
were headed by a single parent. As a result, fewer than one in three (28.7 percent) children
now have a stay-at-home parent, compared to more than half (52.6 percent) in 1975, only a
generation ago.”); Neal, supra note 11.
100. See Parlapiano et al., supra note 11.
101. See, Plumer, supra, note 12 (discussing Warren & Tyagi, supra note 5) (“Two-in-
come families are almost always worse off than their single-income counterparts were a genera-
tion ago, even though they pull in 75 percent more in income. The problem is that so many
fixed costs are rising—health care, child care, finding a good home—that two-income families
today actually have less discretionary money left over than those single-earner families did.”).
102. While the average family spends approximately 18 percent of its income on childcare
costs, families with young children will almost surely spend far more. See infra Part III; see also
Bernard, supra note 10; Morello & Clement, supra note 14; Riley, supra note 14; Schorr, supra
note 14.
103. Cohn et al., supra note 13, at 5.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 6 (“A growing share of stay-at-home mothers (6% in 2012, compared with
1% in 2000) say they are home with their children because they cannot find a job. With
incomes stagnant in recent years for all but the college-educated, less educated workers in
particular may weigh the cost of child care against wages and decide it makes more economic
sense to stay home.”).
106. See Berman, supra note 6 (“Chelsea Belander, 22 and single, lives at her mother’s
house rent free with her one-year-old son, Finn. Belander doesn’t have any income besides the
child support payments she receives from Finn’s dad and cash she earns from doing small jobs
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It is important to recognize not only the short-term but also the long-
term effects of “squeezing” a parent out of work. While it might be tempting
(and comforting) to believe that a parent’s job opportunities will be revital-
ized once her children reach school age, even small gaps in one’s resume can
make an already challenging job market even harder to conquer.107 A parent
“squeezed” out of the job market may find herself out for good.
Disturbing as these trends are, not all problems are for the Internal Rev-
enue Code to solve. Just because childcare is expensive does not mean that
the tax system should allow taxpayers to reduce their taxable income to re-
flect those costs. If a taxpayer purchases a Mercedes-Benz every year, the cost
of the vehicle may eat up a great deal of her income, causing her great finan-
cial stress.108 This does not mean that the Code should—in fact, it unequivo-
cally should not—allow her to reduce her taxable income to reflect these
costs. To determine whether and to what extent the current tax relief §§ 21
and 129 provide is inadequate, one needs to understand certain basic princi-
ples of tax law, specifically those guiding the decision to grant or deny tax-
payers relief—that is, deductions, percentage credits, or exclusions—for
certain expenses. Once introduced, this Article will apply these general prin-
ciples to show that parents should receive tax relief for a far more significant
portion of working childcare expenses than current laws provide.
II. Fundamental Tax Policies: For What Expenses Should
Tax Relief Be Granted?
The ultimate goal of any tax regime is to accurately measure a taxpayer’s
tax liability, which requires the accurate measurement of taxable income
(that is, the base amount on which tax is levied). In order to do so, the
Internal Revenue Code must allow taxpayers to make adjustments for cer-
tain costs. For instance, an income tax must allow taxpayers to deduct the
costs of earning income.109 These adjustments are sacrosanct in the tax law
like mowing the lawn. But she’s calculated that the $8 to $10 an hour she’d make at the jobs
available in her town of Brunswick, Maine, would barely cover the cost of child care, which
runs $250 per week for a half day. ‘That seems stupid to me,’ Belander said of working just to
pay for day care.”).
107. See Warner, supra note 6 (“Eighty-nine percent of those who ‘off-ramped’ . . . said
they wanted to resume work; but only 73 percent of these succeeded in getting back in, and
only 40 percent got full-time jobs.”).
108. And this may be about what it costs to provide annual full-time care for one’s chil-
dren while working. Cf. Schorr, supra note 14 (“One mom friend who has returned to a full-
time job in finance confides she’s paying her nanny an annual salary of, oh, roughly the price
of a 2010 Mercedes SUV.”).
109. See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy:
A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 705, 724 (1970) (“An
income tax is a tax on net income and not a tax on gross receipts; therefore the deductions
from gross income required to produce the net income base must be allowed. Those deduc-
tions, generally speaking, are the expenses and costs incurred in the process of producing or
earning the gross income received by the taxpayer.”).
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and limiting them would compromise the accurate calculation of net in-
come,110 the tax base the United States seeks (and has always sought) to
tax.111
By contrast, an income tax should not provide tax relief for the costs of
consuming goods and services.112 While certain provisions of the Code allow
taxpayers to deduct or credit designated consumptive expenditures, these
sections seek to accomplish a series of nontax objectives. For instance, the
Code allows a taxpayer to deduct interest associated with her home mort-
gage, not to calculate properly the taxpayer’s liability but to encourage
homeownership. Congress could, therefore, limit or repeal these provisions
at any time without undermining the proper measurement of the income
tax base. Somewhere between these two extremes are costs for activities that
have both consumptive and nonconsumptive elements. Congress may limit
the relief these provisions provide but must be wary of the extent to which it
does so, as overly stringent limitations might frustrate the tax-related goals
of these provisions, leading to unfairness. Section II.A describes purely con-
sumptive expenses, for which no tax relief is warranted. Section II.B de-
scribes purely nonconsumptive expenses, for which full tax relief is
necessary. Section II.C turns to hybrid expenses—expenses that have both
consumptive and nonconsumptive aspects—noting that working childcare
expenses will likely fall within this final categorization.
A. Unnecessary Adjustments: Tax Reductions for Consumptive Expenses
A theoretically pure income tax should not allow taxpayers to deduct
(or credit) the costs of consuming goods and services.113 For instance, a tax-
payer does not need to deduct (or receive any tax relief to reflect) the costs
of purchasing toys for his children in order to accurately calculate his net
income. These expenses are purely consumptive and there is, therefore, no
110. See id.
111. E.g., Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n v. United States, 459 F.2d 513, 518 (Ct.
Cl. 1972) (“[F]rom 1913 on, Congress has always directed the domestic levy at some net gain
or profit . . . .”).
112. This tenet derives from the Haig-Simons definition of income, which generally pro-
vides that income is the sum of one’s consumption (for example, costs of purchasing goods for
personal enjoyment) and accumulation (for example, savings). See Robert Murray Haig, The
Concept of Income, in The Federal Income Tax 7 (Robert Murray Haig ed. 1921), reprinted in
Richard A. Musgrave & Carl S. Shoup, Am. Econ. Ass’n, Readings in the Economics of
Taxation 54 (1959) (arguing that income is consumption plus accumulation); see also, e.g.,
William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 309, 330
(1972) (“The adjustments by which taxable income can be made to give a more refined reflec-
tion of aggregate personal consumption and accumulation may be positive or negative. If a
substantial item of personal consumption is enjoyed without any cash expenditure, then the
appropriate adjustment is to add the value of that item to money income. On the other hand,
if the concept of consumption is elaborated in a way that does not include some items for
which money is spent, then the appropriate adjustment is to deduct the amount of those
expenditures from money income.”); Boris I. Bittker, A “Comprehensive Tax Base” as a Goal of
Income Tax Reform, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 925, 929 (1967).
113. See sources cited supra note 112.
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tax-related reason why a taxpayer should be able to reduce his tax liability to
reflect them. The taxpayer in this hypothetical is not truly poorer by the
amount of the expense—he has simply transformed cash into goods (here,
toys) that benefit his household at least as much as the cost incurred. If the
benefit were not this great, the taxpayer would not have purchased the toys,
as his choice to do so was all his own.
As a default matter, Internal Revenue Code § 262 disallows deductions
for “personal, living, or family expenses.”114 Section 262’s rule may be rea-
sonably viewed as one that uses personal, living, and family expenditures as
a proxy for consumptive expenses. Put another way, § 262 reflects that most
personal, living, and family expenses are consumptive. Accordingly, in addi-
tion to disallowing a deduction for expenses associated with purchasing toys
for his children, § 262 ensures that a taxpayer may not (absent a statutory
exception) deduct the costs of purchasing other items for his family and
children, such as food and clothing.115
Furthermore, a taxpayer may not deduct the costs of “babysitters” hired
to alleviate him of childcare responsibilities that are not associated with his
work—for example, babysitters hired for personal engagements, date nights
with his spouse or partner, or perhaps sorely needed breaks from child-
rearing.116 Again, this disallowance makes sense, as the taxpayer’s wealth has
not been decreased as a result of this expense. Instead, he has used cash to
purchase babysitting services that he must have thought were worth at least
the cost incurred; otherwise, he would not have made the exchange.
As discussed in Part I, the tax law currently allows some limited relief
for these nonworking childcare expenses in §§ 154 and 21. But these are
exceptions Congress has grafted—they are a matter of “legislative
grace”117—and Congress could curtail or repeal them entirely without com-
promising the accurate calculation of a taxpayer’s net income. By contrast,
the Code must make adjustments for nonconsumptive costs in order to
properly compute a taxpayer’s net profit.118
B. Necessary Adjustments: Tax Reductions for
Nonconsumptive Expenditures
Since its inception, the U.S. system of taxation has aimed to tax net
income—that is, a taxpayer’s profits.119 Thus, if a taxpayer were to purchase
114. I.R.C. § 262(a) (2012) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, no
deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses.”).
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. Cf. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934) (“Whether and to
what extent deductions shall be allowed depends upon legislative grace; and only as there is
clear provision therefor can any particular deduction be allowed.”).
118. See Surrey, supra note 109; supra text accompanying note 109.
119. E.g., Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n v. United States, 459 F.2d 513, 518 (Ct.
Cl. 1972) (“[F]rom 1913 on, Congress has always directed the domestic levy at some net gain
or profit, and for almost 60 years the concept that the income tax seeks out net gain has been
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and sell a widget—say, for $15 and $20, respectively—that taxpayer should
not be taxed on the full sales price received but rather the sales price less the
cost of the widget ($20 less $15). The $15 expense produced no consumptive
benefit and instead was aimed purely at income production. It has, there-
fore, long been accepted that the tax system may not tax one’s “return of
capital” (the $15), a requirement that seems to rise (at least almost) to the
level of constitutional necessity.120
Similarly, to accurately measure net income, the Code allows taxpayers
to deduct the “ordinary and necessary” expenses associated with activities
aimed at earning a profit (as opposed to activities pursued for enjoyment).121
Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code, for instance, allows taxpayers to
deduct “all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business”122 and § 212 allows the
deduction of expenses associated with other income-producing activities
that are not quite “continuous” and “regular” enough to rise to the level of a
trade or business.123 To illustrate, suppose Tony Toymaker is in the business
of making and selling adorable handmade toys. In addition to deducting the
costs of making the toys that he sells to customers (such as the cost of raw
materials),124 which ensures that Tony has not been taxed on his return of
capital, Tony may also deduct other necessary costs associated with his toy
business. For instance, if he received a loan to purchase the space he uses to
make and sell the toys, he may deduct the interest on that loan;125 if he
instead rents the space, he may deduct the rental payments.126 If he hires an
employee to help him in his shop, he may deduct the employee’s salary.127
Tony may not, however, deduct any of the costs associated with toys made
inherent in our system of taxation. That is the ‘well-understood meaning to be derived from
an examination of the [United States] statutes which provide for the laying and collection of
income taxes’—the basic test set forth in Biddle v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue . . . .”
(alteration in original) (quoting Biddle v. Comm’r, 302 U.S. 573, 579 (1938))).
120. See Mertens Law of Federal Income Taxation §§ 5.06, 5.13 (Hertsel Shadian ed.,
2008). See generally Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); Doyle v. Mitchell Bros., 247 U.S.
179 (1918); Sullenger v. Comm’r, 11 T.C. 1076 (1948).
121. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2012); see Surrey, supra note 109, at 705–13 (explaining how busi-
ness expenses must be deducted in order to properly calculate one’s tax liability).
122. I.R.C. § 162(a).
123. See, e.g., Higgins v. Comm’r, 312 U.S. 212 (1941) (stating general rule that a taxpayer
may be engaged in a trade or business if his activities are extensive, regular, continuous, and
undertaken with a profit motive).
124. I.R.C. § 1012 (providing a general rule that one’s basis in an asset is its cost); see id.
§ 1001 (defining taxable gain as amount realized minus basis).
125. Id. § 163.
126. Id. § 162(a)(3) (allowing deduction for “rentals or other payments required to be
made as a condition to the continued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or
business”).
127. Id. § 162(a)(1) (allowing deduction for “a reasonable allowance for salaries or other
compensation for personal services actually rendered”).
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for his children, as these costs fall under § 262’s auspices,128 a result which is
also theoretically sensible since these costs are purely consumptive.
Thus, tax relief for nonconsumptive costs such as deductions for costs
associated with income-producing activities are necessary adjustments
needed to properly measure taxable income. Congress cannot limit these
sacrosanct adjustments without compromising the accurate calculation of
the tax base.
C. Hybrid Expenses
While some expenses can be easily placed in the “consumptive” or
“nonconsumptive” categories, other expenses are associated with activities
that have both elements. For instance, consider Larry Lawyer who takes his
client to lunch at Lawyer’s favorite restaurant to discuss a pending case.129 Is
the expense a consumptive expenditure or is it associated with income pro-
duction? The answer is clearly both. On one hand, the lawyer has had the
opportunity to eat, which he needed to do regardless of his work on the
client’s case. On the other hand, had he not had matters to discuss with his
client (who might be a person of very fine taste, requiring some degree of
pampering), he may well have eaten a peanut butter sandwich at his desk.130
As Professor Surrey puts it:
An individual is . . . regarded for tax purposes as having two personalities:
one is a seeker after profit who can deduct the expenses incurred in that
search; the other is a creature satisfying his needs as a human and those of
his family but who cannot deduct such consumption and related
expenditures.131
Thus, if it were possible to tease out the motives of Larry Lawyer, he
could not deduct the portion of the meal cost that represents the sustenance
and enjoyment he derived from eating—the consumptive element—but
could deduct the portion that was related to his business with the client, that
128. See id. § 262.
129. Expenses associated with business-related travel, meals, and entertainment are often
cited as a classic example of expenses that are difficult to categorize. See generally Daniel I.
Halperin, Business Deduction for Personal Living Expenses: A Uniform Approach to an Unsolved
Problem, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 859 (1974).
130. In Moss v. Comm’r, 758 F.2d 211, 212 (1985), Judge Posner presented the problem
colorfully as follows:
Suppose a theatrical agent takes his clients out to lunch at the expensive restaurants that
the clients demand. Of course he can deduct the expense of their meals, from which he
derives no pleasure or sustenance, but can he also deduct the expense of his own? He can,
because he cannot eat more cheaply; he cannot munch surreptitiously on a peanut butter
and jelly sandwich brought from home while his client is wolfing down tournedos Ros-
sini followed by soufflé au grand marnier.
131. 1 Stanley S. Surrey et al., Federal Income Taxation 496 (1972).
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is, the additional cost, if any, he incurred to take the client to lunch com-
pared to the lunch he would have eaten otherwise.132
In reality, it would be impractical (if not impossible) to make these dif-
ferentiations and, as discussed further in Part III, the tax law would have to
determine a practical, though almost always imperfect, way to handle these
hybrid expenses. But presently, it is important for the reader to see that
childcare expenses that enable a taxpayer to work as opposed to other child-
care expenses—the costs of hiring babysitters for date nights, for example—
may at least as an initial, intuitive matter be seen to fall somewhere in this
middling area.
Further, it is important that the reader see that the tax relief provided in
§§ 151 and 24, the sections allowing for the nonworking childcare credit and
personal exemption discussed in Part I, is very different than the tax relief
with which this Article is concerned—namely, tax relief to reflect childcare
expenses associated with a taxpayer’s income-driven activities. As a matter of
tax policy, Congress need not provide any relief for the expenses of caring
for one’s children unrelated to work, as these represent purely consumptive
expenses. By contrast, to the extent that working childcare costs are noncon-
sumptive expenditures, the Code should, as a matter of fundamental policy,
offer tax relief to accurately calculate that taxpayer’s net income. Part III
explores where working childcare expenses fall on this “expense spectrum.”
III. Analyzing the Working Childcare Expense
It seems almost intuitive that working childcare expenses are at least
partly nonconsumptive costs of earning income and not purely consumptive
costs.133 In fact, as discussed in Part I, when Congress changed § 21’s tax
relief from a phased down deduction to a percentage credit, it “believe[d]
that [working childcare] expenses should be viewed as a cost of earning in-
come for which all working taxpayers may make a claim.”134
Nonetheless, some argue that all childcare expenses are purely personal
expenditures, suggesting that tax relief is unnecessary. These arguments have
some superficial appeal. But, as Section III.A shows, once this argument is
analyzed more closely, it is entirely unpersuasive.
132. See Halperin, supra note 129, at 859–60; see also Moss, 758 F.2d at 212–13 (“Al-
though an argument can thus be made for disallowing any deduction for business meals, on
the theory that people have to eat whether they work or not, the result would be excessive
taxation of people who spend more money on business meals because they are business meals
than they would spend on their meals if they were not working.”).
133. Indeed, many share the intuition. See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 112, at 953 (“If the
mother of small children takes a job outside the home, she may have to hire a nurse or baby-
sitter; thus, [allowing a deduction for childcare expenses] is a plausible way to reflect the fact
that the working mother’s salary is not all gravy.”); Feld, supra note 43, at 415–16, 447 (char-
acterizing expense as at least in part an expense of earning income); William A. Klein, Tax
Deductions for Family Care Expenses, 14 B.C. L. Rev. 917, 919 (1973) (stating the same catego-
rization); Daniel C. Schaffer & Donald A. Berman, Two Cheers for the Child Care Deduction, 28
Tax L. Rev. 535, 536 (1973) (explicitly agreeing with Feld’s characterization).
134. S. Rep. No. 94-938, at 132 (1976).
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A. Working Childcare Costs as Purely Personal Costs
It is often argued that parents make the personal choice to have a child
and that, therefore, all expenses associated with that initial choice—includ-
ing childcare costs that enable a taxpayer to work—should not be used to
reduce one’s tax liability.135 It is easier to address this argument if it is bro-
ken into parts:
• Premise 1: The decision to have children is a personal choice.
• Conclusion 1: Thus, all expenses associated with children are personal
expenses.
• Premise 2: No tax relief should be provided for any personal expenses.
• Conclusion 2: No tax relief should be provided for any expenses associ-
ated with children, since they are personal expenses.
In addition to seeming harsh (which is not in and of itself a failing),
there are several weaknesses in this argument. First, the jump from Premise
1 to Conclusion 1 is incomplete. While some families are carefully planned,
not every caregiver would say that she chose to have children. Many
pregnancies are unplanned.136 Sometimes a caregiver gains custody of chil-
dren after a loved one passes. And some individuals believe that their God
prohibits birth control and that He alone is able to choose the number of
children they should have.137 If it is the initial choice to have a child that
renders all expenses associated with that child’s care unworthy of tax relief,
may a family deduct the expenses if its members can show they did not wish
to have the child? It is odd to think that tax relief would hinge on the cir-
cumstances under which each child was conceived.
Further, even for perfectly planned pregnancies, the “choice” to have
children is a different choice than the choice to subscribe to Netflix or use an
iPhone. In Article 16 of its Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations
recognizes the “family [as] the natural and fundamental group unit of soci-
ety” and provides that “[m]en and women of full age, without any limita-
tion due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to
135. See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 129, at 865 (“The nondeductibility of [childcare ex-
penses] is probably not caused by any doubt that these expenses are business related, but by
the belief that they are based on underlying personal decisions which give rise to personal
satisfaction.”).
136. According to one study in 2006, 49 percent of pregnancies were unintended—a slight
increase from 48 percent in 2001. Unintended Pregnancy Prevention, Centers for Disease
Control & Prevention (citing Lawrence B. Finer & Mia R. Zolna, Unintended Pregnancy in
the United States: Incidence and Disparities, 2006, 84 Contraception 478 (2011)), http://www
.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/unintendedpregnancy/ [http://perma.cc/NGU6-NF4J].
137. For instance, among traditional interpretations of the Torah, active prevention of
pregnancy is in violation of the commandment “be fruitful and multiply.” Genesis 1:28.
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found a family.”138 In other words, for many, having children is not a choice
so much as it part of the basic human experience.
In light of this and the original intent of Congress in enacting § 21’s
percentage credit,139 it is better to think that the initial choice to procreate
does not coat all expenses associated with one’s offspring with the taint of
nondeductibility. But even if one were to take the rather staunch view that
those costs are purely personal, Premise 2—that no tax relief should be
given for any personal costs—is theoretically immature despite its ostensible
statutory support. As discussed, § 262’s default rule that “personal, living, or
family expenses”140 are nondeductible can be reasonably viewed as a proxy
rule reflecting the more theoretically mature notion that consumptive costs
should not reduce one’s tax liability because they do not represent a decrease
in one’s wealth.
The question, therefore, is whether working childcare costs are purely
consumptive expenses that should not be deducted because, in paying a
caregiver to tend to one’s children, a working parent has simply transformed
her wealth from cash to childcare services. Unlike the case in which parents
pay caregivers to tend to personal matters, such as babysitting costs that
facilitate date nights, there are compelling reasons to think that net wealth
decreases when parents incur childcare costs to work.
Imagine Spouse and Partner (S&P), a married couple filing jointly, have
two children. Suppose that Spouse, the primary wage earner, earns $150,000
this year and that S&P have decided their family requires $50,000 additional
disposable income to meet its needs.141 Luckily, Partner has a job offer which
will enable her to earn $70,000 annually. To do so, however, S&P must incur
childcare expenses so that their children are cared for during working hours.
After a vigorous search, S&P determine that the only option that meets their
needs will cost $20,000. Spouse and Partner think the services are probably
worth about half this cost and would never choose to pay the $20,000 if they
had full, free choices. But they do not. Assuming this is their best or only
choice in childcare, S&P will still pay $20,000 because doing so will enable
them to earn the additional income they require.
Importantly, this hypothetical is not simply a play with numbers. As
discussed in Part I, there are various reasons why options for full-time care
are limited. For instance, day-care centers have notoriously long wait-lists
and are often unwilling (or uncertified) to care for young infants.142 Further-
more, a couple may feel the need to hire an expensive, individual caregiver
138. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 16, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948), http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a16 [http://perma.cc/XAN5-
JWWR].
139. See supra Section I.A.
140. I.R.C. § 262 (2012).
141. The hypothetical assumes, for simplicity, that all income is ordinary income and that
the earned amounts are in post-tax dollars.
142. See supra Section I.A.
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to ensure childcare coverage even when children are sick.143 There is, there-
fore, strong cause to doubt the driving assumption that childcare costs are
purely consumptive expenses. One cannot so easily assume that parents in-
curring working childcare costs (as opposed to nonworking costs) have paid
caregivers at least as much as the perceived value of those services. This
creates a convincing argument that at least some tax relief for working child-
care costs is needed.
Moreover, even if parents valued the working childcare services pur-
chased at cost, the purchase is still involuntary, driven by the need to find
care for one’s children while working. The forced nature of this transaction
further suggests that costs for working childcare are not consumptive in the
traditional sense. And not allowing a deduction for these somewhat involun-
tary expenses creates issues of horizontal equity—that is, it compromises the
notion that similarly situated taxpayers should be taxed the same. In a semi-
nal article, Professor Andrews raises similar arguments to defend the tax
law’s allowing a deduction for some of a taxpayer’s medical expenses.144
While the ill taxpayer may value at cost the medical services needed to make
him well again, these services simply put him back in the same position as
the taxpayer that was fortunate enough to enjoy good health.145 A deduction,
Andrews argued, seems to preserve horizontal equity so that similarly situ-
ated taxpayers are taxed the same.146 Similarly, it makes sense to compare the
situations of a family with a “stay-at-home” parent who provides childcare
with those of dual-earner and single parent families that, while each earning
the same income as the first family, must incur the significant additional
costs of childcare. The working childcare expenses incurred by these latter
families simply restore them to the position of the first, single-earner couple,
and a deduction for at least a portion of these expenses, like the medical
expense deduction, seems justified on these grounds.
Similar reasoning might (and should) be applied to criticize other tax
laws, which disallow tax relief for other significantly nonconsumptive costs.
For instance, the tax laws do not allow taxpayers to reduce their taxable
income to reflect commuting costs147 or the costs of many graduate schools,
such as law school, that enable the taxpayer to enter a new profession.148 Like
working childcare costs, the fact that these expenses are not deductible “is
143. See supra Section I.A.
144. Andrews, supra note 112, at 331–43.
145. Id. at 314 (“As between two people with otherwise similar patterns of personal con-
sumption and accumulation, a greater utilization of medical services by one is likely not to
reflect any greater material well-being or taxable capacity, but rather only greater medical
need.”).
146. Id. at 331–43.
147. IRS, Publication 463, Travel, Entertainment, Gift and Car Expenses 14
(2014), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p463.pdf [http://perma.cc/UV6A-GMAW] (“Daily
transportation expenses you incur while traveling from home to one or more regular places of
business are generally nondeductible commuting expenses.”).
148. IRS, Publication 970, Tax Benefits for Education 67 (2014), http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-pdf/p970.pdf [http://perma.cc/MCB6-WNRS] (“Education to maintain or improve
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probably not caused by any doubt that these expenses are business related,
but by the belief that they are based on underlying personal decisions which
give rise to personal satisfaction.”149 As shown in this Part, this argument is
theoretically incomplete and does not justify disallowing a deduction for
these costs. This Article, however, focuses only on the working childcare
cost, and a companion paper will address more broadly the tax law’s failure
to allow individual taxpayers to deduct various nonconsumptive costs.
Having dismantled the argument that working childcare costs are purely
consumptive expenses, this Article turns to what seems the more persuasive
argument—that working childcare costs are, at least in part, nonconsump-
tive expenditures. As discussed, to the extent that expenses are nonconsump-
tive, tax relief must be granted to accurately measure income.150 Ideally then,
one would situate working childcare costs along the “expense spectrum” de-
scribed in Section II, the ends of which consist of purely nonconsumptive
costs (for which a full deduction is warranted) and purely consumptive costs
(for which no deduction is warranted) and provide a tax reduction repre-
senting only the nonconsumptive portion of the expense.
As the next Section shows, for most taxpayers, working childcare costs
fall far toward the nonconsumptive end of the expense spectrum, suggesting
that the stringently limited relief §§ 21 and 129 provide is inadequate as a
matter of fundamental tax policy.
B. To What Extent Are Working Childcare Costs Consumptive?
1. A Framework for Analyzing Hybrid Costs
This Section attempts to situate working childcare costs, along with sev-
eral other hybrid costs, on the expense spectrum described in Part II. To do
so, one must tease out the consumptive and nonconsumptive elements of
these costs. Of course, this cannot be done with exact precision because each
taxpayer derives a different mix of benefits from various costs. But a mean-
ingful approximation of where a particular cost would fall on the expense
spectrum, and hence how much tax relief is warranted, can be made by
estimating the size of three subsets of taxpayers:151
i.) The Full Consumption Subset: The subset of taxpayers that would incur
a particular cost regardless of work. In the case of working childcare costs,
a parent will fall within this subset if the consumptive benefits of working
childcare are so great that she would have purchased that care even if it did
not enable her to earn any income.
skills needed in your present work is not [deductible] qualifying education if it will also qualify
you for a new trade or business.”).
149. Halperin, supra note 129, at 865.
150. See supra Section II.B.
151. These subsets utilize the concepts developed by Professor Daniel Halperin in analyz-
ing the problem of business-related meals and entertainment expenses. See Halperin, supra
note 129, at 866.
February 2016] Uncle Sam and the Childcare Squeeze 587
ii.) The Substantial Benefit Subset: A taxpayer in this subset will enjoy sub-
stantial consumptive benefits from the goods or services purchased, but
will not enjoy benefits substantial enough to put the taxpayer in the Full
Consumption Subset. In the case of working childcare costs, a parent
would fall in this subset if she would not incur these costs if the purchased
childcare did not enable her to earn income, but the income required to
make the childcare costs worthwhile is quite a bit less than the total cost of
care.
iii.) Insubstantial Benefit Subset: The subset of taxpayers that will derive
only insubstantial consumptive benefits from a specific cost. In the case of
working childcare costs, other than the ability to earn income, parents in
this subset will enjoy only slight benefits from the childcare purchased and
would, therefore, incur few childcare costs if they were not working outside
the home.
By considering census and other collected data, the next Section shows
that most parents who incur working childcare costs fall within this last
subset, suggesting that working childcare costs are largely nonconsumptive
expenditures for which substantial tax relief is required.
2. Analyzing the Working Childcare Cost
In 1972, two commentators wrote:
The working wife who hires a babysitter, or sends her children to a day care
center, can be viewed as spending money to enable herself to work, or, just
as easily, as working so that she can afford the luxury of . . . child care
help.152
This characterization leads one to believe that in 1972 some significant
percentage of secondary wage earners (at this time, almost certainly
mothers) could be expected to fall within the Full Consumption Subset. If
this portrayal is true, there may have once been good reasons to limit the tax
relief provided for working childcare costs. Regardless of the veracity of this
caricature, however, the picture one finds today is quite different. Today, the
income of the secondary wage earner is generally not “discretionary”153 and
families increasingly report that they need two incomes just to meet daily
needs.154
Furthermore, the 1972 caricature places the mother in a somewhat en-
joyable, part-time job. But whatever one thinks about her children, few par-
ents work a full-time schedule in order to avoid them. Perhaps there exists
working parents who despise spending time with their children and gleefully
152. Schaffer & Berman, supra note 133, at 536.
153. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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dispose of them each weekday for nine hours. But the more common feel-
ings of working women and men seem to be ambivalence and guilt.155 Fur-
thermore, as discussed in Part I, in today’s economic environment, childcare
costs represent a strikingly large percentage of a family’s combined salary,
and a family with two young children may easily find itself spending over
$35,000 per year on childcare.156 Few parents can be expected to incur these
high costs unless that care enables them to work.
Of course, it is common for stay-at-home parents to hire help to care for
their children. Parents sometimes hire mother’s helpers and nurses when
children are young,157 and they sometimes send their toddlers to preschool
and pre-kindergarten programs.158 But recent census data suggest that an
extremely large majority of families with stay-at-home parents do not use
any of these arrangements and therefore incur none of the childcare costs
incurred by dual-earner and single-parent families. In 2011, approximately
88 percent of families with working mothers used “regular childcare”—that
is, a childcare arrangement used at least once per week—for children under
five years of age.159 By contrast, only 28.2 percent of single-earner families
with preschool-aged children used any form of childcare on even a weekly
basis.160 In other words, in an extremely large majority of cases, parents tend
to care for their young children themselves, unless work prohibits it.
These data not only suggest that, in the case of working childcare costs,
the Full Consumption Subset will be sparsely populated, but also that the
Substantial Benefit Subset—parents who only require a small amount of ad-
ditional income to make childcare costs worthwhile—will be small. One
might initially expect a sizable percentage of parents to fall within this sub-
set. After all, many working parents likely believe that their selected caregiv-
ing facility or caregiver provides their children valuable opportunities for
socialization and education.161 But this does not mean that these parents
would incur the costs associated with this care in the absence of work. While
working parents may be pleased that their child is benefiting from working
childcare, these parents may have provided the same (if not, at least in their
opinions, superior) benefits to their children at free or lesser cost if they
155. See Margie Warrell, Letter to Working Mothers: Stop Feeling So Guilty, Forbes (June
25, 2013, 6:08 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/margiewarrell/2013/06/25/dear-working-
mother-stop-feeling-so-guilty/ [http://perma.cc/R4BN-BJK7]; see also Kim Parker & Wendy
Wang, Modern Parenthood: Roles of Moms and Dads Converge as They Balance Work and Fam-
ily, Pew Res. Ctr. (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/03/14/modern-
parenthood-roles-of-moms-and-dads-converge-as-they-balance-work-and-family/ [http://per
ma.cc/D8HS-GK9J] (“[A] nearly equal share of mothers and fathers say they wish they could
be at home raising their children rather than working . . . .”).
156. See supra Section I.C.
157. Laughlin, supra note 68, at 3–4, 10–11.
158. Id. at 3–4.
159. Id. at 5.
160. Id.
161. See Julie Revelant, 6 for Kids—And Moms Too, Fox News (Dec. 1, 2013), http://www
.foxnews.com/health/2013/12/01/6—for-kidsand-moms-too/ [http://perma.cc/63DN-VUNF].
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were not working outside the home. For instance, play dates, homeschool-
ing, and parent-driven activities provide far cheaper and often-utilized
methods of providing socialization and educational opportunities for young
children.162 The census data described above support these intuitions—over
70 percent of families with young children and stay-at-home parents entirely
forewent any form of regular outside care.163
Furthermore, while some small percentage of nonworking parents seek
outside care, they employ that care for only a fraction of the time that work-
ing parents do.164 And families with stay-at-home parents are far more likely
to rely solely on relatives such as grandparents for childcare—an arrange-
ment that may come at little to no monetary cost—since these parents will
generally require care for far fewer hours than dual-earner and single-work-
ing parents.165 Thus, in the case of working childcare costs, the lion’s share of
working parents will fit most easily into the Insubstantial Benefit Subset.
This analysis shows that working childcare costs are largely noncon-
sumptive and that parents should, therefore, receive tax relief for a sizable
percentage of these costs. As discussed in Part I, however, the tax law comes
nowhere close to providing this. Taxpayers earning over $43,000 can, at
maximum, claim the equivalent of a $4,000 deduction under § 21 (assuming
a 30 percent marginal tax bracket), or $5,000 under § 129’s FSA exclusion.
In even the very cheapest of states, this amounts to less than half the costs of
providing full-time care for an infant and toddler. In the most expensive
states, this will amount to less than one-sixth of the cost of providing full-
time care for two young children in a childcare center and may amount to a
deduction of about one-tenth of the costs of hiring an individual caretaker
like a nanny.166
This Article next considers the way in which the tax laws treat other
hybrid expenses. As explained in Section III.A, this Article does not address
the tax law’s failure to allow tax relief for commuting and various educa-
tional expenses, saving that discussion for a companion paper. In failing to
address these costs, however, the next Section does not seek to fully survey
the ways in which the tax laws treat all hybrid expenditures but instead seeks
to show that the tax law currently allows greater relief for some hybrid ex-
penditures that are more consumptive than working childcare expenses, fur-
ther strengthening the argument that the limitations found in §§ 21 and 129
are far too stringent.
162. See Do Kids Really Need Preschool?, Huffington Post (Mar. 21, 2013, 12:04 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/learnvest/do-kids-need-preschool_b_2917827.html [http://per
ma.cc/3667-JM9C] (discussing alternatives to formal preschools, including play dates, parks,
classes, and museums).
163. Laughlin, supra note 68, at 4.
164. See id. at 5–6.
165. See id. at 5.
166. See supra notes 74–87 and accompanying text.
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C. Comparing Working Childcare Costs to Other Hybrid Expenses
1. Business-Related Meal and Entertainment Expenditures
Suppose that Larry Lawyer flies to his favorite city to discuss a pending
case with a client who lives there. He stays in his favorite hotel and orders
room service for breakfast. He also takes the client to Larry’s favorite restau-
rant, where they discuss the case. After dinner, Larry brings the client to
watch Larry’s favorite baseball team. May Larry deduct the costs of traveling
to and staying in his favorite city? May he deduct the entertainment costs of
taking himself and his client to dinner and a ball game? There are evident
challenges in determining what tax relief is warranted for these meal and
entertainment expenditures. Like working childcare costs, these expendi-
tures are associated with both nonconsumptive and consumptive activities.
But the consumptive aspect of the meal and entertainment expense seems
far more significant.
For one thing, the subset of taxpayers falling within the Full Consump-
tion Subset described in Section III.B will be sizable—that is, it is easy to
imagine taxpayers incurring meal and entertainment expenditures without
work-related reasons for doing so. For instance, regardless of his client’s ex-
istence, Larry Lawyer may well have visited his favorite city, stayed in his
favorite hotel, dined on a fancy dinner, and purchased tickets to watch his
favorite team play baseball. People attend happy hours, restaurants, shows,
and sporting events without work-related reasons for doing so. In contrast,
nonworking parents do not tend to send their children to childcare for
forty-five hours per week—and, in fact, census data show that most families,
absent the necessity of work, do not use any form of outside childcare at all.
Thus, the Full Consumption Subset will be much more populated in the case
of meal and entertainment expenses when compared to the case of working
childcare costs.
Further, in the case of meal and entertainment expenditures, the Sub-
stantial Consumption Subset will be sizable. Even if Larry Lawyer would not
have incurred the described expenses had he not needed to attend to his
client’s business, he would nonetheless have derived some personal pleasure
from the activities. At the very least, Larry would have eaten even if he were
not on the business trip.167 Thus, while census data suggest that relatively
few working parents can be expected to fall within the Substantial Con-
sumption Subset, most taxpayers incurring meal and entertainment expend-
itures should fall within this group (if not within the Full Consumption
Subset). As a result, the Insubstantial Benefit Subset can be expected to be
far smaller in the case of meal and entertainment expenses when compared
to the case of the working childcare cost.
One would, therefore, expect the tax law to provide more tax relief for
working childcare costs than it does for meal and entertainment expenses. In
167. See Halperin, supra note 129, at 860–61 (discussing the consumptive nature of meal
and entertainment expenses).
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almost all cases, however, the tax law allows for the reverse. Currently, tax-
payers may claim a deduction of 50 percent of “entertainment, amusement,
or recreation”168 expenses, like expenses for dining and ball games, so long
as the activity is not “lavish” and the activity is sufficiently related to the
taxpayer’s business.169 But working parents requiring full-time childcare are
generally entitled to tax relief that is worth far less than a deduction for half
of their costs.
2. Business-Related Moving Expenses
Currently, the tax law allows taxpayers to deduct most moving expenses
that are “incurred . . . in connection with the commencement of work”170 so
long as the taxpayer’s move occurs within one year of receiving the new job,
and the new job is “at least 50 miles farther from [the taxpayer’s] former
home than [her] old main job location was from [her] former home.”171 In
fact, if the taxpayer moves separately from his family, both sets of moving
costs may be deducted.172 Clearly, however, the reasons for moving from
one’s current residence are varied and not solely motivated by the desire to
earn income.
Families, for instance, may move for more housing space, a lower cost of
living, or better school districts for their children. A taxpayer, in deciding to
leave his current location, may wish to live closer (or farther) from his fam-
ily, or find a community whose interests and beliefs align more closely to his
own. Thus, while a family may not move until work is found, many, if not
168. I.R.C. § 274(n)(1) (2012).
169. See I.R.C. § 274(a) (stating that the activity must either be directly related to or
associated with the taxpayer’s trade or business). These laws were arrived at after a period of
considerable debate and thought. In 1962—the Mad Men age of the two-martini lunch—
President Kennedy, in his Special Message to Congress on Taxation, expressed his grave con-
cern that “expense account living ha[d] become a byword in the American scene” and that
“[t]oo many firms and individuals ha[d] devised means of deducting too many personal living
expenses as business expenses, thereby charging a large part of their cost to the Federal Gov-
ernment.” President Kennedy “recommend[ed] that the cost of such business entertainment
. . . be disallowed in full as a tax deduction and that restrictions be imposed on the deductibil-
ity of . . . expenses of business trips combined with vacations, and excessive personal living
expenses incurred on business travel away from home.” President John F. Kennedy, Special
Message to the Congress on Taxation (Apr. 20, 1961), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
?pid=8074 [http://perma.cc/K935-2BCV]. But Congress did not go nearly as far as President
Kennedy urged.
170. I.R.C. § 217 (“There shall be allowed as a deduction moving expenses paid or in-
curred during the taxable year in connection with the commencement of work by the taxpayer
as an employee or as a self-employed individual at a new principal place of work.”); IRS,
Publication 521, Moving Expenses 2–4 (2013), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p521.pdf
[http://perma.cc/JML9-RMWN]. Not all expenses qualify. For instance, closing costs on house
purchases are nondeductible. See id. at 9.
171. IRS, supra note 170, at 2–5. Notably, the fifty-mile distance test is slightly different
when a taxpayer has a principal place of work prior to the move.
172. See id. at 8.
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most, families choose to move for various nonwork related reasons. There-
fore, although the Full Consumption Subset may not be very populated in
the case of business-related moving expenses—for many, attaining new em-
ployment will be a necessary condition of moving—most taxpayers that in-
cur deductible moving expenses fall within the Substantial Consumption
Subset. As a result, only a small minority of taxpayers fall within the Insub-
stantial Subset—that is, will have moved solely for employment and not
because the relocation offered other significant consumptive benefits.
This suggests that the percentage of working childcare costs that may be
deducted should be at least as great as the percentage of business-related
moving expenses eligible for a deduction. This is again not so, however, as
the tax law allows a full deduction for qualifying moving costs and only
allows parents tax relief equivalent to a deduction for a fraction of working
childcare costs.
3. Hobby Expenses173
Consider finally how the tax law handles expenses associated with activ-
ities that are “not for profit,”174 more colloquially referred to as “hobby ex-
penses.” Suppose, for instance, that Jack and Jill (J&J) together earn $50,000.
Suppose, however, that J&J do not have children and so do not incur child-
care expenses. They do, however, really enjoy racing their yacht and incur
$20,000 of expenses, including travel expenses, entrance fees, and boat
maintenance to do so. J&J incur these expenses for the love of their hobby
and do not care whether they win or lose. But they are very lucky one year
and win $30,000. Should J&J be able to deduct the yacht racing expenses?
Many hobbyists will fall into the Full Consumption Subset because they
are willing to incur the expense of engaging in these activities regardless of
whether they earn any income. The remainder fall within the Significant
Consumption Subset, only requiring a relatively slight amount of income
(that need not exceed costs) in order to incur the hobby expenses. The Insig-
nificant Consumption Subset will be, by definition, unpopulated since the
activity is presumptively not profit motivated. It would, therefore, not be at
all unreasonable to fully disallow deductions for hobby expenses—in many
cases, such as the case of J&J, the hobbyist is not truly poorer by the amount
of his hobby expenses because he received enjoyment (consumptive value) at
least equal to the cost incurred.
Nonetheless, § 183 of the Code allows taxpayers to deduct these costs
with several limitations. In this example, for instance, J&J may only deduct
173. This Section will assume away the Alternative Minimum Tax to show how § 183
applies as a default matter to hobby expenses. The hypothetical has purposefully presented a
situation in which the taxpayer’s income falls below the exemption amount so that the AMT
will not apply. For more about the AMT, see What You Should Know About AMT, IRS (Feb. 10,
2014), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/What-You-Should-Know-about-AMT [http://perma
.cc/W3C8-PQ3M].
174. I.R.C. § 183.
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an amount equal to their gain on the transaction175—here because J&J’s gain
is $30,000, J&J may, before other limits, deduct the entire $20,000. They
must then subtract 2% of their adjusted gross income from this amount
(here $1,600),176 so J&J are left with $18,400 expenses to deduct.177
Astonishingly, then, § 183 may provide more tax relief for the hobbyist
than full-time working parents. Compare J&J’s situation to the situation of a
married couple that together earns $80,000—the same amount of income as
J&J. But instead of spending $20,000 on yacht racing, this couple spends
$20,000 on childcare while they are working. Section 21 allows the couple a
20% credit of up to $6,000 expenses, an equivalent of only a $4,000 deduc-
tion if the couple’s marginal tax bracket is 30%.178
The preceding analysis strongly suggests that working childcare costs
are, at least in significant part, nonconsumptive expenditures for which sub-
stantial tax relief is warranted. As also shown, however, the current law does
nothing close to this. Instead, current law limits the relief provided to tax-
payers incurring working childcare costs more severely than it limits the
relief for more consumptive expenditures. The next Part develops a proposal
that would achieve meaningful reform and help prevent the overtaxation of
the modern working family.
IV. Proposal For Reform: Preventing the Overtaxation
of the Working Family
A. The Method of Reform Matters
Given that the tax relief Code §§ 21 and 129 provide is inadequate,
lawmakers seeking to change these laws must be careful when choosing an
avenue of reform. It might, for instance, seem sufficient to raise the current
dollar limitations, percentage limits, and phaseouts in these sections, which
together ensure that parents receive tax relief for only a fraction of the work-
ing childcare costs they incur. But while this would certainly be a step in the
right direction, it would leave these reformed laws vulnerable to the same
legislative dysfunction that allowed the tax relief provided to working fami-
lies to become so inadequate in the first place.
As discussed in Section I.B, Congress originally enabled working parents
to deduct working childcare expenses, properly characterizing these ex-
penses as nonconsumptive costs of earning income.179 Congress, however,
175. See id. § 183(b).
176. See id. § 67 (establishing a 2 percent floor for miscellaneous itemized deductions like
the one in this example).
177. If J&J had been in a higher tax bracket, they might have been subject to limitations in
§ 68. See id. § 68(a)–(b). Further, J&J might lose the benefit of deducting hobby expenses if
the Alternative Minimum Tax were to apply. See id. § 55. As discussed supra note 173, I mean
only to show how § 183 treats hobby expenses as a default matter.
178. See supra Section I.B. Alternatively, had S&P funded the day care through an FSA,
they could have received the equivalent of a $5,000 deduction. See supra Section I.B.
179. See supra Section I.B.
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later changed the mechanism for providing tax relief for working childcare
expenses from a deduction to a percentage credit in order to eliminate the
upside-down-subsidy effect of the deduction.180 While doing so, it expressly
rejected the idea of phasing down the credit because it is inappropriate to
phase down costs of earning income.181
Section 21’s current phaseouts are, therefore, directly inconsistent with
Congress’s express intent. Furthermore, Congress’s failure to index the dol-
lar limitations in both §§ 21 and 129 for inflation and rising costs is incon-
sistent with Congress’s general intent to treat working childcare costs as
costs of earning income. Although it is theoretically possible that subsequent
Congresses rejected the original intent of these sections, there is no indica-
tion whatsoever that this is the case. Instead, it is exceedingly likely that
lawmakers became confused by the fact that working childcare costs are
creditable, as opposed to deductible, under § 21.182 In general, the average
individual taxpayer is allowed to deduct his costs of earning income. By
contrast, when Congress grants individuals tax relief for nonconsumptive
expenditures, which it need not do to accurately calculate net income, it
often does so by providing a tax credit.183 Thus, as time left the historical
purposes of § 21 forgotten, lawmakers likely assumed that § 21’s credit
served a nontax purpose (since that is the function that many other individ-
ual tax credits serve) and that working childcare costs were nonconsumptive
costs (like the expenses for which many other individual tax credits are
granted).
Other factors likely contributed to this misunderstanding. Frankly, some
confusion might be attributable to the skeptical eye with which many
lawmakers view the Internal Revenue Code. Unfortunately, many lawmakers
lack respect for the tax law and more generally fail to make any effort to
understand the Code as even a semicoherent body of law. While the inten-
sity of the problem seems to have increased as of late, this is certainly not a
new issue. As Professor Surrey laments:
[Some lawmakers] . . . see the income tax as only the composite or jumble
of statutory provisions resulting from numerous ad hoc legislative deci-
sions. Such an anarchistic view of the tax structure has the consequence of
making tax policy formulation a task to be performed without criteria,
180. See supra Section I.B.
181. See supra Section I.B.
182. Consider even two sections located right before and after Code § 24. Code § 23 al-
lows taxpayers a $10,000 tax credit for adopting a special-needs child, regardless of whether
those expenses are even incurred. See I.R.C. § 23(a)(3). Section 25C provides a tax credit to
encourage taxpayers to invest in energy-efficient improvements. Id. § 25C. These sections are
congressional “giveaways” and serve entirely nontax purposes. Specifically, § 23’s credit is a
subsidy meant to encourage citizens to adopt special-needs children and § 25C’s credit subsi-
dizes and encourages taxpayer to invest in energy-efficient improvements. Despite how lauda-
ble these goals are, Congress could repeal the tax relief in these sections at any time without
compromising the accurate calculation of tax.
183. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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guidelines, or standards, and any policy official who has tried to approach
the tax conscientiously would reject that view.184
But while congressional attitudes may play some part in misunderstand-
ing the role of §§ 21 and 129, there are also more understandable reasons
why lawmakers might have become confused. In addition to the fact that
most credits serve nontax purposes and are not the method by which tax
relief for costs of earning income are granted, lawmakers were probably mis-
led by the Joint Committee on Taxation’s questionable decision to include
§§ 21 and 129 on its list of so-called tax expenditures. For the nontax expert,
some background on this list is in order.
In the 1960s, Stanley Surrey, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary of
Treasury for Tax Policy,185 first expressed concern over the number of tax
provisions that provided tax reductions for expenditures that were not asso-
ciated with the cost of earning income (which he called “tax expenditures”)
and, therefore, not necessary adjustments to accurately calculate tax liabil-
ity.186 Thus, while Surrey recognized that some tax provisions—such as the
deduction for ordinary and necessary business expenses—should be consid-
ered “structural provisions necessary to the application of a normal income
tax,”187 he also recognized that many other provisions were best viewed as
“special preferences.”188 Surrey explained:
These special preferences, often called tax incentives or tax subsidies, are
departures from the normal tax structure and are designed to favor a par-
ticular industry, activity, or class of persons. They partake of many forms,
such as permanent exclusions from income, deductions, deferrals of tax
liabilities, credits against tax, or special rates. Whatever their form, these
departures from the “normative” income tax structure essentially represent
government spending for the favored activities or groups made through the
tax system rather than through direct grants, loans, or other forms of gov-
ernment assistance.189
In this “rhetorically brilliant move”190 Surrey urged lawmakers to view
these “tax expenditure provisions” as direct government spending pro-
grams191 in order to encourage lawmakers to subject these provisions to a
higher level of scrutiny than they were then receiving. To illustrate, suppose
a taxpayer received a loan to purchase a home for his family, using that
184. Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept and the Budget
Reform Act of 1974, 17 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 679, 687–88 (1976) (footnote omitted).
185. Surrey served as Assistant Secretary from 1961 to 1969 while on leave from his posi-
tion as a professor at Harvard Law School. Erwin N. Griswold, A True Public Servant, 98
Harv. L. Rev. 329, 330 (1984).
186. See Stanley S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform: The Concept of Tax Expendi-
tures vii–viii (1973).
187. Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 184, at 680.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 Duke L.J. 1155, 1158.
191. Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 184, at 718.
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residence to secure the loan. Under the basic principles discussed in Part II,
the taxpayer should not be able to deduct the interest payments associated
with this home mortgage.192 This interest is a purely consumptive cost. The
tax law, however, allows taxpayers to (up to generous limitations) deduct
this interest by providing for a specific exception in Code § 163(h).193 While
there are reasons lawmakers might wish to do this—for example, the deduc-
tion might encourage home ownership194—these reasons have nothing to do
with accurately calculating the homeowner’s income tax liability. By encour-
aging lawmakers to view this provision as a direct spending program,195 Sur-
rey hoped lawmakers would scrutinize the wisdom of granting the home
mortgage interest deduction in the same way it would scrutinize the wisdom
of a program that directly paid a portion of the interest on a homeowner’s
mortgage.196
In response to Surrey’s pleas, the Congressional Budget and Impound-
ment Control Act of 1974 (CBICA) created a requirement that the Congres-
sional Budget Office (CBO) and the Treasury Department each publish an
annual list of tax expenditure estimates197 that would “measure the decrease
in individual and corporate income tax liabilities that result from [tax ex-
penditure provisions].”198 CBICA defines “tax expenditures” as “revenue
losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special
exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide a
special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.”199
The concept of tax expenditure is not elucidated further in CBICA and
its legislative history only states that tax expenditures should be viewed as
departures from a “normal” tax structure.200 Thus, to fulfill the responsibili-
ties created by CBICA, both the CBO and the Treasury Department must
determine which tax provisions represent “tax expenditures.” With only the
explicit guidance that these provisions are “special,” the Joint Committee on
192. See supra Part II. See generally I.R.C. § 163 (2012).
193. I.R.C. § 163(h).
194. But see Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of the American Dream, 87 Wash. U. L. Rev. 329,
336–37 (2009) (arguing that tax benefits do not impact the decision to purchase a home).
195. Thuronyi, supra note 190, at 1155 (“The concept of ‘tax expenditures’ holds that
certain provisions of the tax laws are not really tax provisions, but are actually government
spending programs disguised in tax language.”).
196. In many instances, Surrey believed that this analysis would often reveal that the tax
expenditure was an absurd use of government funds. See, e.g., Surrey, supra note 186, at
223–32 (explaining how the charitable deduction, if reformulated as a direct spending pro-
gram, would look absurd).
197. Pub. L. No. 93-344, §§ 3, 301(d)(6), 601, 88 Stat. 297, 299, 308, 323–24 (1974) (codi-
fied as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 622, 632, and 31 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(16) (2012)).
198. Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 97th Cong., Estimates of Federal Tax Ex-
penditures for Fiscal Years 1982–1987, at 2 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter 1982–1987
Estimates].
199. Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 3(3), 88 Stat. at 299 (1974).
200. See 1982–1987 Estimates, supra note 198, at 2–3.
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Taxation201 (on behalf of the CBO)202 and the Treasury Department have
developed various methodologies for separating tax expenditures from other
tax provisions.203
Since issuing its first report, the Joint Committee on Taxation (the JCT)
has characterized §§ 129 and 21 as tax expenditure provisions.204 Consider-
ing this characterization, which this Article later shows to be misguided, it is
not surprising that lawmakers have mischaracterized the tax relief provided
by these sections as legislative giveaways that could be limited or repealed
without compromising the accurate calculation of tax. Perhaps highlighting
this confusion, some recent legislative proposals have actually called for the
complete repeal of § 21’s credit. For instance, in 2014, David Camp, then-
Chairman for the House Committee on Ways and Means, released a propo-
sal to overhaul the United States’ individual tax regime and suggested that
§ 21’s credit be repealed along with a host of other provisions that grant tax
relief for purely consumptive expenditures.205
Considering this historical background, if lawmakers wish to enact long-
lasting reform that truly protects the working family, they should not simply
provide first aid to §§ 21 and 129. Instead, Congress should allow parents to
deduct the costs of childcare in the same way that other costs of earning
income are deducted. The next Part provides a blueprint for enacting this
reform.
201. As explained on its website, the committee “is a nonpartisan committee of the United
States Congress, originally established under the Revenue Act of 1926. The Joint Committee
operates with an experienced professional staff of Ph.D economists, attorneys, and account-
ants, who assist Members of the majority and minority parties in both houses of Congress on
tax legislation.” About Us: Overview, Joint Committee on Tax’n, https://www.jct.gov/about-
us/overview.html [http://perma.cc/F4GX-TF94].
202. Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 113th Cong., Estimates of Federal Tax
Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2012–2017, at 2 n.4 (Comm. Print 2013) (citing Act of Dec.
12, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 273, 99 Stat. 1037, 1098 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§ 601(f) (2012))) (“The Joint Committee staff issued reports prior to the statutory obligation
placed on the CBO and continued to do so thereafter. In light of this precedent and a subse-
quent statutory requirement that the CBO rely exclusively on Joint Committee staff estimates
when considering the revenue effects of proposed legislation, the CBO has always relied on the
Joint Committee staff for the production of its annual tax expenditure publication.”).
203. See generally Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 114th Cong., Background In-
formation on Tax Expenditure Analysis and Historical Survey of Tax Expenditure
Estimates (2015).
204. Staff of U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury & Joint Comm. on Internal Revenue Tax-
ation, 93rd Cong., Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures 5 (Comm. Print 1973).
205. In explaining reasons for repealing the credit, the proposal explains “[t]he dependent
care credit is complex and overlaps with other tax provisions that provide tax benefits for
families” and that “[c]onsolidating redundant and complex family tax benefits, such as the
dependent care credit, into an increased child credit and standard deduction would result in
significant simplification.” Comm. on Ways & Means Majority Tax Staff, 113th Cong.,
Tax Reform Act of 2014 Discussion Draft 13 (Comm. Print. 2014). This reflects a funda-
mental misunderstanding of the tax laws. As discussed in Part I, tax relief for working expenses
and nonworking expenses serve entirely different purposes in the tax law.
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B. A Blueprint for Enacting Meaningful Reform
Congress should do five things to reform the tax laws so that working
childcare costs are treated like other costs of earning income.
First, lawmakers should replace the percentage credit in § 21 with a de-
duction. In general, the law allows taxpayers to deduct (not credit) the costs
of earning income.206 Thus, § 21’s percentage credit mechanism stands
working childcare costs apart from other costs of earning income and seems
to invite misunderstanding by lawmakers who may assume that the credit
(like many other credits) serves nontax related purposes.207 As discussed, this
misconception may partially explain why the dollar limitations found in
§ 21 have not been changed for well over a decade.208 Thus, treating working
childcare expenses the same as other costs of earning income, in addition to
promoting consistency in the Code, would provide an important and appar-
ently needed signal to Congress that these costs cannot be repealed without
compromising the accurate calculation of net income.
Second, the proposed deduction for working childcare costs should be
an “above-the-line” deduction used to calculate a taxpayer’s adjusted gross
income (AGI) (an essential figure needed to calculate one’s tax liability that
will be discussed below). There are two types of deductions in the tax law,
colloquially referred to as “above-the-line” and “below-the-line” deductions.
Generally, consumptive personal expenditures fall below the line and do not
reduce a taxpayer’s AGI.209 By contrast, most expenses that are “ordinary
and necessary” to one’s trade or business, such as business-related moving
expenses210 and meal and entertainment expenses,211 to which working
childcare costs can easily be analogized, may be deducted above the line,212
thereby reducing a taxpayer’s AGI.
206. Compare supra Section II.B (discussing the tax law’s tendency—and need—to allow
taxpayers to deduct the cost of doing business from the calculation of their income), with
supra Section II.A (explaining why purely consumptive expenses are generally not deductible).
207. See supra note 182 (discussing credits with nontax related goals).
208. See supra notes 53–59 and accompanying text.
209. See I.R.C. § 62(a) (2012) (listing above-the-line deductions and not including most
personal deductions). But see id. § 62(a)(10) (allowing alimony, a purely personal expense, to
be deducted above the line).
210. Id. §§ 62(a)(15), 217.
211. Id. §§ 62(a)(1), 162(a).
212. Unreimbursed expenses incurred by an employee fall “below the line,” under
§ 62(a)(2)(A), in order to subject him to certain limitations that are inapplicable to above-the-
line deductions. Id. § 62(a)(2)(A). Thus, to the extent an employee incurs deductible expenses
that are not reimbursed under his employer’s reimbursement plan, those expenses will not be
used to calculate adjusted gross income. Id. This likely reflects skepticism that employee ex-
penses that an employer is unwilling to reimburse are truly nonconsumptive expenditures.
Clearly, this reasoning in no way implicates the working childcare deduction, and it would be
patently absurd to allow parents engaged in their own trade or businesses (for example, the
solo law practice) to deduct working childcare costs above the line while having employee-
parents (like lawyers working for a law firm) deduct costs below the line.
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“Above-the-line” deductions also include a somewhat motley assort-
ment of other costs such as certain expenses of performing artists,213 ele-
mentary and secondary school teachers,214 and alimony.215 While a coherent
theory for determining what expenses should be used to calculate AGI seems
lacking from this list, one can form a better opinion of how working child-
care expenses should be characterized by considering the importance of the
AGI amount. AGI is calculated by subtracting above-the-line deductions
from one’s gross income.216 AGI, in turn, determines the extent to which the
personal exemption amount,217 various “below-the-line” deductions, and
credits218 may be claimed to reduce one’s tax liability. In most instances, as
one’s AGI increases, one’s ability to claim these tax reductions decreases.219
For example, a taxpayer may deduct medical expenses and casualty losses to
personal property caused by fire, storm, or other unexpected events to the
extent that each of these expenses or losses exceeds 10 percent of his AGI.220
The higher his AGI, the higher the floor.
It is essential that taxpayers be allowed to reduce their AGI to reflect
working childcare expenses. As this Article shows, because parents may only
deduct a fraction of their working childcare costs, their income is overstated.
By failing to allow any of these costs to reduce adjusted gross income (at
least those that are directly incurred, as opposed to diverted through a de-
pendent-care FSA), working parents will also be entitled to deduct fewer
below-the-line costs than similarly situated families that do not require
childcare, further exacerbating the problem.
Consider, for instance, Families A, B, and C and suppose the following:
Mrs. A earns $150,000 each year while Mr. A cares for their two small chil-
dren; both Mr. and Mrs. B together earn $170,000 and directly pay a day
care $20,000 to care for their children while they work, entitling them to
§ 21’s percentage credit; and Mr. and Mrs. C collectively earn $170,000 but
divert the $20,000 they need for childcare to a dependent-care FSA, entitling
them to § 129’s exclusion. Suppose finally that each of these families incurs
$25,000 of medical expenses and suffers a $20,000 casualty loss, each which
213. Id. § 62(a)(2)(B).
214. Id. § 62(a)(2)(D).
215. Id. § 62 (a)(10).
216. Id. § 62(a) (defining AGI).
217. Id. § 151(d)(3) (providing phaseout of the personal exemption amount based on
AGI). For a discussion of the personal exemption, see supra Section I.A.
218. See, e.g., id. §§ 21, 24 (providing credits that phase out based on AGI).
219. See, e.g., id. § 67(a) (creating overall limitation that certain below-the-line deduc-
tions may be claimed only to the extent they exceed 2 percent of AGI); id. § 68 (creating an
overall limitation on ability to claim most personal deductions based on AGI); id. § 165(c), (h)
(providing deduction for casualty losses to the extent expenses exceed 10 percent of AGI); id.
§ 213(a) (providing deduction for medical expenses to the extent expenses exceed 10 percent
of AGI). But see id. § 170 (providing that charitable contributions may be deducted up to a 50
percent of AGI ceiling, thus allowing wealthier taxpayers to deduct more than less well-off
taxpayers).
220. See, e.g., id. §§ 165(c), (h), 213(a).
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may be deducted to the extent the expenses or losses exceed 10 percent of
the taxpayer’s AGI.
After childcare costs are paid, each family has $150,000 income at their
disposal. Nonetheless, each taxpayer’s adjusted gross income will be differ-
ent. Family A will have adjusted gross income of $150,000, which seems to
correctly reflect net income. B will have adjusted gross income of $170,000
because working childcare expenses may not be deducted above the line.
And C will have adjusted gross income of $165,000 because $5,000 of the
expenses diverted to the FSA may be excluded under § 129.221 As a result, the
extent to which each of these similarly situated families may claim the “be-
low-the-line” medical and casualty loss deductions will be different, as will




Income $150,000 $170,000 $165,000
Childcare -------- $20,000 $20,000
AGI $150,000 $170,000 $165,000
Medical Expense 
Deduction $10,000 $8,000 $8,500
Casualty Loss 
Deduction $5,000 $3,000 $3,500
Personal Exemption $16,000 $16,000 $16,000
Taxable income $119,000 $143,000 $137,000
Pre-credit Tax $21,337.50 $27,337.50 $25,837.50
Child Tax Credit -------- -------- --------
Working Child Care 
Credit $0 $1,200 $200
Final Tax $21,337.50 $26,137.50 $25,637.50
221. Id. § 129(a).
222. A few notes about Table 1: The numbers are based on 2015 tax rates, and the Table
assumes a $4,000 personal exemption amount. See Rev. Proc. 2014-61, 2014-47 I.R.B., 866,
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb14-47.pdf [http://perma.cc/9ZDP-LPVZ].
While Family C has earned $170,000,  it has diverted $20,000 into an FSA. Section 129
allows it to exclude $5,000 of that amount, bringing its gross income down to $165,000. I.R.C.
§ 129(a)(2)(A).
The child tax credit, discussed supra in Section I.A., will be completely phased out for
each of these taxpayers. See id. § 24(a)–(b).
Family C receives a $200 credit as a result of the interplay between §§ 129 and 21.
Because § 129 only allows taxpayers to exclude $5,000 but § 21 allows a credit up to $6,000 in
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As this example illustrates, the tax liabilities of working Families B and
C are over 20 percent higher than the tax liability of single-earner Family A,
even though each of these families has the same disposable income after
accounting for working childcare costs. This chasm is, of course, created
largely by the working families’ inability to reduce their taxable incomes to
reflect most of their childcare costs. But this chart also shows how the failure
to allow deductions above the line whittles away other deductions. For in-
stance, Family B’s medical and casualty loss deductions are, respectively, 20
percent and 40 percent lower than that of Family A. This disparity can be
corrected by allowing deductions for working childcare costs to fall above
the line.
Finally, transforming the percentage credit to an above-the-line deduc-
tion would enable the relief provided by § 21 to be equated with the relief
provided by § 129’s FSA exclusion and eliminate the strange situation in
which Family B is taxed more than Family C, despite being in economically
identical positions. As a result, § 129’s FSA exclusion would be rendered
duplicative of the new deduction and could be omitted to simplify the cur-
rent system.223
Third, the new deduction should not phase out. As discussed in Section
I.B.1, § 21’s credit “phases out” as income levels rise. But the Code does not
phase out deductions for costs of earning income because to do so would be
to misunderstand the reason behind allowing these deductions—namely, to
accurately measure a taxpayer’s net income. One cannot phase out a deduc-
tion based on income level when that deduction is needed to accurately
calculate income in the first place.
Nor is a phaseout appropriate to limit the upside-down-subsidy effect,
discussed in Part I.B, which occurs as a result of a deduction. While it is a
worthy goal to temper this effect when caused by deductions of purely con-
sumptive expenses, it cannot be modified for costs of earning income, at
least so long as the United States continues to (as it always has) tax net
income progressively. Put differently, deductions for the cost of earning in-
come will inevitably result in the greatest tax savings for taxpayers in the
highest marginal tax brackets; but these deductions cannot be altered be-
cause they are needed to calculate net income. Comparing the richer widget
salesman to the struggling one, the former will receive more value when he
deducts the costs of widget parts, for traveling to widget conventions, and
for taking potential widget purchasers to lunch. There is no reason to be
more concerned about this fact in the context of working childcare costs.
Fourth, the proposed deduction should not include the “earned income
limitation” found in both §§ 21 and 129. Currently, §§ 21 and 129 provide
that a single taxpayer may not credit expenses that exceed her taxable in-
come for the year and that a couple filing jointly may not credit or exclude
expenses, Family C may claim the additional $1,000 as a percentage credit. Because the phased
down percentage is 20%, a credit of $200 is allowed. See id. §§ 21, 129.
223. Specifically Code § 129 could be revised to apply only to in-kind benefits, such as
when an employer provides employees discounted on-site day care.
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expenses that exceed the income of the lowest wage earner.224 To illustrate,
suppose Harry earned $100,000 this year while Sally earned $5,000, incur-
ring $6,000 in working childcare expenses. Although the dollar limitations of
§ 21 would allow a percentage credit for $6,000 of expenses,225 Harry and
Sally, assuming they are married and filing jointly, are limited to a percent-
age credit of $5,000 expenses, Sally’s salary. The rationale is probably that
the tax law should only encourage taxpayers to work outside the home when
that work will enhance efficiency, apparently defined as work that produces
annual income exceeding the annual cost of childcare. But this rationale is
shortsighted. Even small resume gaps can drastically hinder the ability of an
individual to return to the workforce.226 At the same time, infant and pre-
school care is by far the most expensive care.227 Thus, a nonprimary wage
earner caring for an infant or preschool-aged child might rationally choose
to work in a position that does not cover her current childcare costs in order
to preserve future earning capacity. The Code’s judgment that this repre-
sents inefficient behavior is shortsighted.
Fifth, the reformed deduction should not contain dollar limitations on
the amount of expenses for which tax relief may be granted. As discussed in
Section I.B, both §§ 21 and 129 impose dollar limitations on the amount of
work-related childcare expenses that can be credited or excluded.228 As dis-
cussed in Section I.C, these limitation amounts represent a mere fraction of
the costs most families will incur to provide full-time childcare, particularly
if the family has multiple or young children. These childcare costs are merely
one of many costs of earning income. But the Code does not impose dollar
limitations on other costs of earning income—it does not insist that the car
manufacturer use parts that are not too pricey or that the restaurateur be
sufficiently frugal with his ingredients.
Still, one might want to impose some limits on working childcare costs
since, unlike expenses for car parts or food ingredients, such costs have a
consumptive whiff. To do so, an easy analogue is available in the tax laws
224. Code § 21(d) provides an “earned income limitation” that reads as follows:
(1) In general
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the amount of the employment-related
expenses incurred during any taxable year which may be taken into account under sub-
section (a) shall not exceed—
(A) in the case of an individual who is not married at the close of such year, such
individual’s earned income for such year, or
(B) in the case of an individual who is married at the close of such year, the lesser of
such individual’s earned income or the earned income of his spouse for such year.
I.R.C. § 21(d).
225. Id. § 21.
226. See Warner, supra note 6 (“Sylvia Ann Hewlett, an economist and the founding presi-
dent of the Center for Talent Innovation in New York, surveyed thousands of women in 2004
and after the financial crisis in 2009. She has found that roughly a third of ‘highly qualified
women’ leave their jobs to spend extended time at home. . . . Most of the women, Hewlett
found, stayed home longer than they had hoped.”).
227. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 57–64 and accompanying text.
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providing deductions for business-related entertainment and meal expenses,
which limit possible expenses to those that are not “lavish or extravagant.”229
As applied, this standard aims to curb only the most profligate spending. As
explained by the IRS,
An expense is not considered lavish or extravagant if it is reasonable con-
sidering the facts and circumstances. Expenses will not be disallowed just
because they are more than a fixed dollar amount or take place at deluxe
restaurants, hotels, nightclubs, or resorts.230
Disallowing a deduction for “lavish and extravagant” working childcare
expenses seems perfectly appropriate, so long as the standard is applied in
the same weak-toothed manner as it is in the meal and entertainment con-
text. Just as attending to business at a deluxe restaurant is not a lavish or
extravagant business expense,231 neither is it lavish or extravagant for a
working parent to select an individual caregiver—as opposed to, for in-
stance, using a cheaper day care—to tend to her children, particularly since
this choice is sometimes a parent’s only feasible option.232 Nevertheless, this
standard does provide some limitations on the expenses that taxpayers may
incur with Uncle Sam’s help. If a company purchases its clients and employ-
ees seats in a luxury skybox, it may only deduct the costs of nonluxury
seats.233 Similarly, if a parent sends her child to a fancy day camp in which
professional golfers instruct children to perfect their drives, she may only
deduct the nonlavish cost of, for instance, hiring an individual caregiver for
the time spent at camp.
These five items provide a basic framework for aligning tax relief for
working childcare expenses with the tax relief for other costs of earning in-
come. No further limitations are needed or appropriate. But if lawmakers
sought further limitations, Congress might consider a percentage limitation
like that found in § 274. Under this provision, taxpayers may only deduct 50
percent of business-related meal and entertainment expenses.234 In this con-
text, the idea that the government and taxpayer should split these expenses
seems justifiable, if not slightly arbitrary. It can easily be argued, for in-
stance, that while any particular taxpayer may have had business reasons for
a meal, he nonetheless would have had to eat anyway. In other words, the
substantial consumptive element is somewhat irrefutable in this context.
On the other hand, one cannot unequivocally say that a parent would
have needed childcare regardless of her being at work—as discussed above,
many families with stay-at-home parents forego regular childcare entirely.
Hence, there is little reason why the taxpayer should have to split the tax
229. IRS, supra note 147, at 12.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See supra notes 84–93 and accompanying text.
233. For instance, if a firm were to purchase a skybox to entertain ten clients, it may
deduct only the cost of ten nonluxury seats. IRS, supra note 147, at 13.
234. I.R.C. § 274(n) (2012).
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savings with the government down the middle. As shown in Part III, meal
and entertainment expenditures are far more consumptive than working
childcare costs. Therefore, a more appropriate percentage limitation—if one
were insisted on—would significantly exceed 50 percent and be somewhere
close to 100 percent. If this change were implemented, Congress could en-
sure that no parents were aversely impacted by the change by allowing tax-
payers to receive tax relief equal to the greater of the tax savings currently
allowed under §§ 21 and 129 and a deduction for (say) 90 percent of actual
working childcare expenses. Given the soaring costs of childcare and the
severe limits of the current tax laws, the reformed deduction would likely be
chosen in almost all cases.
Other tax laws allow taxpayers to deduct expenses up to a specified ceil-
ing amount. For instance, taxpayers may deduct amounts contributed to
charity but only to the extent that donations do not exceed 50 percent of the
taxpayer’s income.235 This ceiling reflects the notion that, at some point, the
taxpayer is diverting an exorbitantly large portion of his income away from
the government’s reach. But these income caps are somewhat curious in that
the cap is increased as income increases. Furthermore, the “lavish and ex-
travagant” limitation suggested above would seem to capture costs exceeding
this ceiling anyway. Nonetheless, if Congress wished to impose some addi-
tional limitation on the ability of families to reduce their taxable income to
reflect working childcare expenses, an income cap could also be considered.
C. Potential Objections Hindering Future Reform
As with any suggested reform, potential objections might hinder its pro-
gress. The most obvious objection to the proposed reform is that too much
revenue will be foregone. First, this objection is, at least in large part, funda-
mentally unsound. One does not ask whether it costs too much to allow the
car manufacturer to deduct the costs of parts or the storeowner to deduct
the costs of his employees. These adjustments are necessary to accurately
calculate tax and it does not matter how much revenue is lost. To the extent
that working childcare costs are nonconsumptive costs of earning income,
foregone tax revenue is beside the point.236
Furthermore, while some revenue is sure to be lost if the proposed re-
forms are implemented, it may not be nearly as much as one initially thinks.
It is currently likely that many transactions occurring between parents and
caregivers occur in cash, which increases the chance that the caregiver will
235. Id. § 170(b)(1)(A).
236. See Schaffer & Berman, supra note 133, at 536–37. It is particularly inappropriate to
oppose childcare deductions on the grounds that the tax base should not be further eroded.
There is no doubt much to be said for the principle that the key to reform of the federal
income tax is to reduce as far as possible all exclusions from gross income, and, more to the
point here, all or most personal deductions. The resulting increase in the tax base would
enable us to reduce tax rates, finance more government services or both. But the principle has
nothing to do with the childcare deduction. Even those who insist on the most comprehensive
of tax bases agree that the cost of generating income must be deductible.
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underreport her income.237 Put more colloquially, parents often pay
caregivers “under the table.” The current tax system, which provides tax
relief for only a fraction of actual childcare costs, does little to prevent this.
Under the proposed reforms, however, parents would be able to obtain tax
relief for most, if not all, of their working childcare costs. To do so, the tax
laws might require parents to identify the caregivers paid, creating a mecha-
nism for the IRS to check for underreporting.
Furthermore, if the proposed reforms were implemented, more nonpri-
mary wage earners would be able to work. The importance of this should
not be understated. Even small resume gaps can pose trouble for an individ-
ual re-entering the workforce.238 Therefore, making it affordable for parents
to work through the early years of their children’s lives not only results in
their earning additional (taxable) income in those years, but also preserves
their ability to work, and, therefore, contribute to the tax base, for the re-
mainder of their lives.
Another possible objection to the proposed reform is that the tax law
should neither encourage nor discourage nonprimary wage earners to work.
There are a number of responses to this argument. Most importantly, to the
extent that working childcare costs are a cost of earning income, the objec-
tion is once again fundamentally unsound. As discussed in Part II, a tax-
payer must be able to deduct the costs of earning income in order to
properly calculate her tax liability. Thus, allowing the toymaker (or gun
maker) a deduction for costs of making toys (or guns) might be said to
encourage toy (or gun) production. But whatever one thinks of toys (or
guns) the tax law needs to allow the deduction to accurately capture income.
Similarly, to the extent providing a deduction for working childcare ex-
penses is a necessary adjustment to reflect income, it does not matter
whether one believes parents should be encouraged to work or that a
woman’s place is in the home.
Next, the objection that the proposed reforms would encourage nonpri-
mary wage earners to enter the workforce very arguably has it backward.
The current system should be viewed as causing behavioral distortions by
discouraging nonprimary wage earners from working. Thus, the proposed
reforms are better viewed as eliminating (and not causing) economic distor-
tions. Put another way, the proposed reforms would equalize the treatment
of a couple with children, one of whom provides childcare and therefore
237. See, e.g., Ilan Benshalom, Taxing Cash, 4 Colum. J. Tax L. 65, 67 (2012).
(“[I]ndividuals use [cash] to conceal certain transactions from their creditors and the state. . . .
Cash allows income underreporting, which is the most significant source of tax evasion . . . .”);
Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Presumptive Collection: A Prospect Theory Approach to Increasing
Small Business Tax Compliance, 67 Tax L. Rev. 111, 112 (2013) (“At one end of the spectrum
are wage-earning employees, who demonstrate a near perfect rate of compliance [with income
tax law]. At the other end of the spectrum are self-employed individuals earning business
income, whose overall compliance rate is less than 50%. Tax evasion is a particular problem
among self-employed individuals engaged in cash businesses, who are estimated to report a
staggeringly low 19% of their income.” (footnotes omitted)).
238. See Warner, supra note 6.
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incurs no working childcare costs, and a similarly situated working family
that must incur these costs. Finally, couples increasingly need two incomes
to meet their needs.239 Thus, the concern that the proposed reform would
change a taxpayer’s decision as to whether to enter the workforce breaks
down significantly, since parents increasingly have little choice in the matter.
It is also important when enacting a change in the tax laws to consider
who can actually be expected to benefit from the reforms—that is, to ask
whether the intended beneficiaries will truly enjoy the tax savings produced
or whether the reformed tax laws will really end up helping an unintended
group. If the tax law changes to allow families to deduct working childcare
costs from their income, it will obviously produce great benefits to working
parents. But some part of the tax savings produced by a reformed childcare
deduction might inure to the benefit of childcare workers in the form of
higher wages. Specifically, because the proposed reform would lower the
post-tax cost of childcare, childcare workers might demand—and parents
might be able to afford—an increase in salary. Lawmakers should welcome
this possible secondary effect, as childcare workers have long fought to earn
even a living wage.240
D. Protecting Progress: How to Prevent the Reoccurrence of Past Mistakes
As discussed in Section IV.A, the tax relief provided to working families
through § 21’s childcare credit and § 129’s FSA exclusion may have become
so inadequate due in large part to the Joint Committee on Taxation’s deci-
sion to place these provisions on its list of tax expenditures, signaling to
Congress that they were “special” tax provisions that could be limited or
repealed without compromising the accurate calculation of the income tax.
This characterization is inappropriate, however. The question of how one
should separate tax expenditure provisions from other tax provisions has
long been a subject of debate. Both the Joint Committee on Taxation, acting
on behalf of Congress, and the Treasury Department have vacillated between
two methodologies,241 indicating that even the actors statutorily required to
identify tax expenditures understand the question to be murky.
Given the multiple methodologies used by the JCT and Treasury to
identify tax expenditures (and given that the JCT and Treasury have reached
inconsistent conclusions even when using almost identical methods), it is
unsurprising that scholars have also weighed in on how to best separate tax
expenditure provisions from other provisions of the Code. But while it is
unclear which methodology is best suited to identify tax expenditures provi-
sions, a look at each of these methodologies reveals that it is quite clear that
239. See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text.
240. E. Tammy Kim, Why Do the People Raising Our Children Earn Poverty Wages?, Na-
tion (July 31, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/article/why-do-people-raising-our-children-
earn-poverty-wages/ [http://perma.cc/ZD3D-5BB2]; Claire Zillman, Child Care Workers Join
Fast Food Workers’ Fight for $15 an Hour, Fortune (Mar. 30, 2015, 9:44 PM), http://fortune
.com/2015/03/30/child-care-workers-pay/ [http://perma.cc/B5X4-PL89].
241. See infra Sections IV.D.1–3.
February 2016] Uncle Sam and the Childcare Squeeze 607
the working childcare provisions should not be included on this list. By ap-
plying each of the methodologies for identifying tax expenditures developed
by the JCT and the Treasury Department, as well as several developed by
scholars and economists, this Section shows that the far stronger argument
is that neither § 21 nor 129 should be characterized as a tax expenditure
provision. In order to prevent future misunderstandings that leave working
families vulnerable to overtaxation, provisions providing tax relief for work-
ing childcare costs should be excluded from all future tax expenditure lists.
1. The Joint Committee on Taxation’s Predominant Model
The predominant model the Joint Committee on Taxation (on behalf of
the Congressional Budget Office) used to define tax expenditures seizes on
the legislative history of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Con-
trol Act of 1974 (CBICA), which created the requirement that the CBO and
the Treasury Department each publish an annual list of tax expenditure esti-
mates.242 This legislative history simply states that tax expenditures are devi-
ations from the “normal tax structure”243 without further explanation. Thus,
the JCT generally considers all tax provisions that deviate from this hypo-
thetically normal income tax as tax expenditures to be referenced and esti-
mated in its annual reports.244
To perhaps state the obvious, this puts enormous pressure on the defini-
tion of a “normal” tax structure and, as a result, this standard is highly (and
rightly) criticized as overly ambiguous if not completely devoid of substance.
As Professor Bittker puts it: “[E]very man can create his own set of tax ex-
penditures, but it will be no more than his collection of disparities between
the income tax law as it is, and as he thinks it ought to be.”245
Nonetheless, for nearly four decades, the JCT has clung to the idea of
using the normal tax structure as a reference point.246 According to it, the
242. Pub. L. No. 93-344, §§ 3, 301(d)(6), 601, 88 Stat. 297, 299, 308, 323–24 (1974) (codi-
fied as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 622, 632, 31 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(16) (2012)).
243. The JCT’s reports specifically reference legislative history for the first time in 1982,
seeming to then adopt the idea of normal tax. The 1982 report states as follows: “The legisla-
tive history of the Act indicates that tax expenditures are to be defined with reference to a
‘normal’ tax structure.” 1982–1987 Estimates, supra note 198, at 2. Before that time, mention
was sometimes made to the normal tax structure but it is not entirely clear that the concept
had been formally adopted.
244. In 2008, an alternative methodology was used. Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation,
110th Cong., Estimate of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2008–2012, at
3–10 (Comm. Print 2008) [hereinafter 2008–2012 Estimates]. In 2009, however, the JCT
returned to the previous method. Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 111th Cong., Esti-
mates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2009–2013, at 4–5 (Comm. Print
2010) [hereinafter 2009–2013 Estimates]. The alternative methodology is discussed infra in
Section IV.C.
245. Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for “Tax Subsidies” in the National Budget, 22 Nat’l Tax J.
244, 260 (1969); see also Thuronyi, supra note 190, at 1158.
246. This is not necessarily to criticize the JCT, which is trying to fulfill the CBO’s statu-
tory responsibilities to the best of its ability. In fact, the JCT often recognizes the imperfect
nature of its model. In its 1984 report, for instance, the JCT states:
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normal tax structure includes, among other things, the personal exemptions
provided to each taxpayer and her dependents (discussed at Section I.A), the
standard deduction (to be discussed more below) and “deductions for costs
incurred in producing net income, e.g., investment expenses or the cost of
the tool that a mechanic purchases for use on his job.”247 In other words,
these items, as part of the normal tax structure are not, by definition, devia-
tions from that structure and, therefore, not tax expenditures.
The JCT has always characterized tax relief for working childcare ex-
penses, whether it took the form of the older phased-out deduction, the
current percentage credit, or the exclusion for employer-provided childcare,
as tax expenditures.248 But even under the JCT’s own definition of a normal
income tax, this seems incorrect for at least two reasons.
First, the JCT states that a “normal” income tax does not include vari-
ous costs of earning income.249 This is an uncontroversial premise, and while
it is likely that each person’s definition of what constitutes a normal income
tax will differ in some respects, no well-reasoned articulation of a normal
The staff acknowledges that its concept of a normal tax structure may err on the side of
being too narrow and that its definition of tax expenditures may err on the side of being
too broad. The staff’s approach traditionally has been to list any item as a tax expenditure
for which there is a reasonable basis for such classification and a revenue loss above a de
minimis amount. The staff emphasizes, however, that in the process of listing tax expen-
diture items no judgment is made, nor any inference intended, about the desirability of
any special provision as public policy, or about the effectiveness of the tax approach
relative to other methods available to the Federal Government for achieving the particu-
lar public policy goals intended.
Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 98th Cong., Estimates of Federal Tax Expendi-
tures 1984–1989, at 4 (Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter 1984–1989 Estimates].
247. Id. at 4. The concept of normal income tax was not expressed exactly the same in all
JCT annual reports, but in all reports a normal income tax was seen to include the personal
exemption amounts and included some expression that costs of earning income should be
included as well. The 1984 report also stated as follows:
Under the individual income tax, this normal tax structure includes a single personal
exemption for each taxpayer and one for each dependent; the zero bracket amount,
which serves as a general minimum standard deduction for all taxpayers; the progressive
tax rate structure; the exclusions for various types of imputed income, such as the rental
value of owner-occupied homes; and deductions for costs incurred in producing net
income, e.g., investment expenses or the cost of the tool that a mechanic purchases for
use on his job.
Id. at 3–4. The JCT’s 2001 Report stated as follows:
Under the Joint Committee staff methodology, the normal structure of the individual
income tax includes the following major components: one personal exemption for each
taxpayer and one for each dependent, the standard deduction, the existing tax rate sched-
ule, and deductions for investment and employee business expenses. Most other tax ben-
efits to individual taxpayers can be classified as exceptions to normal income tax law.
Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 107th Cong., Estimates of Federal Tax Expendi-
tures for Fiscal Years 2001–2005, at 3 (Comm. Print 2001).
248. See, e.g., 1984–1989 Estimates, supra note 246, at 14 tbl.1.
249. Id. at 4 (“Deductions for costs incurred in producing income are considered part of
the normal tax structure and, therefore, are not listed as tax expenditures.”).
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income tax could possibly exclude adjustments for the costs of earning in-
come.250 The JCT does not provide further guidance on how to make the
determination of what costs are sufficiently associated with the cost of earn-
ing income that they become part of the normal tax structure and fall en-
tirely outside of the tax expenditure categorization. Nonetheless, one gains
some information about the JCT’s thought process by looking at the types of
expenses it puts in the “cost of earning income” basket. For instance, the
JCT does not include on its list of tax expenditures “deductions for business-
related travel expenses,” entertainment expenses, and “moving expenses.”251
But, as discussed in Part III, these expenses are more consumptive than
working childcare costs. If these deductions are not characterized as tax ex-
penditures, than the tax relief provided by §§ 21 and 129 (or by a reformed
childcare deduction) should not be either.
Furthermore, the JCT explains its reasons for including the personal
exemption amounts and standard deduction in its version of a normal in-
come tax structure—that is, not classifying the personal exemption amount
or standard deduction as tax expenditures—as follows:
The staff does not include as tax expenditures either the zero bracket
amount or the personal exemption for the taxpayer and dependents be-
cause Congress believes these amounts approximate the level of income
below which it would be difficult for an individual or a family to obtain
minimal amounts of food, clothing and shelter.252
The “zero bracket” amount refers to the “standard deduction” provided
to all taxpayers regardless of expenses actually incurred. In 2014, for in-
stance, a married couple filing jointly may claim a standard deduction of
$12,400 along with a personal exemption amount of $3,950 for each spouse
and each dependent.253 Thus, a married couple with two children earning
anything under $28,500 will not have any taxable income (and thus find
themselves in a “zero bracket”) for 2014.
But under this reasoning, it seems that tax relief for working childcare
costs might be viewed in a similar way as the standard deduction and per-
sonal exemption amount are viewed, not as a tax expenditure but as part of
a normal income tax. A simple illustration drives home the point. Consider
Couples A and B, each with two young children and each earning a com-
bined salary of $29,500. Suppose that one member of Couple A earns
$29,500 by herself while the other member of that couple cares for their
children. Congress has determined couples need $28,500 to simply survive
250. See supra Part II.
251. See, e.g., 1984–1989 Estimates, supra note 246, at 4–5 (“Deductions for costs in-
curred in producing income . . . are not listed as tax expenditures. These include deductions
for moving expenses, employee business expenses, investment expenses, and business-related
travel expenses.”).
252. Id. at 4.
253. In 2014, Various Tax Benefits Increase Due to Inflation Adjustments, IRS (Oct. 31,
2013), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/In-2014,-Various-Tax-Benefits-Increase-Due-to-In-
flation-Adjustments [http://perma.cc/35PZ-ZNFC].
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and, therefore, Couple A should only be taxed on the $1,000 income that
exceeds that critical amount. The government should not, in other words,
burden the amount needed for subsistence. The personal exemption and
standard deduction amounts ensure that this is true.
Now suppose that, in contrast to Couple A, both members of Couple B
work, together earning $29,500. When both members of Couple B are at
work, they incur $1,000 additional cost for childcare. Couple B has only the
$28,500 Congress believes it needs to provide basic necessities. But without
relief for working childcare costs, Couple B would (like Couple A) be taxed
on $1,000 and would (unlike Couple A) be unable to survive. In this way,
the percentage credit allowed in § 21 seems to provide needed adjustments
to the dual-earner and single-parent families’ tax liability that ensures that
they, like single-earner couples, are not taxed on the basic amount needed
for mere survival. There is, therefore, a rather compelling case that working
childcare relief should not be viewed as a “tax expenditure” at all but, like
the personal exemption and standard deduction, as part of the normal tax
structure defining a minimum level of income below which no taxation will
be levied.
As discussed, using the highly malleable concept of a normal income tax
to differentiate tax expenditures from other tax provisions has received
much criticism. As a result, in 2008 the JCT developed an alternative meth-
odology for characterizing tax provisions.254 After only one year of using this
alternative model, however, it returned to the predominate model just de-
scribed.255 Nonetheless, the alternative model provides a different way to
think about whether provisions that allow tax relief for working childcare
costs should be characterized as tax expenditures. This alternative analysis
also suggests that the working childcare provisions should be removed from
the tax expenditure list.
2. The Joint Committee on Taxation’s Alternative Model
In 2008, under the direction of now-Professor, then-JCT Chief of Staff
Edward Kleinbard, the Joint Committee on Taxation made a valiant attempt
to respond to the many criticisms of its predominant model, relying on a
“normal” income tax. In its pamphlet entitled, A Reconsideration of Tax Ex-
penditure Analysis, the JCT wrote:
Tax expenditure analysis no longer provides policymakers with credible in-
sights into the equity, efficiency, and ease of administration issues raised by
a new proposal or by present law, because the premise of the analysis (the
validity of the “normal” tax base) is not universally accepted. Driven off
track by seemingly endless debates about what should and should not be
254. 2008–2012 Estimates, supra note 244, at 3–10.
255. 2009–2013 Estimates, supra note 244, at 4–5.
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included in the “normal” tax base, tax expenditure analysis today does not
advance . . . the . . . goals that inspired its original proponents . . . .256
The JCT’s alternative approach separated tax expenditures into two cat-
egories: “Tax Subsidies,” which consist mainly of those provisions that were
generally categorized under the predominant approach as tax expenditures,
and a new category called “Tax-Induced Structural Distortions.”257 Under
this alternative model, provisions granting relief for working childcare costs
could only feasibly fall within the “Tax Subsidies” category.258
A “Tax Subsidy” was defined “as a specific tax provision that is deliber-
ately inconsistent with an identifiable general rule of the present tax law (not
a hypothetical ‘normal’ tax), and that collects less revenue than does the
general rule.”259 “Tax-Induced Structural Distortions” were defined as fol-
lows:  “structural elements of the Internal Revenue Code (not deviations
from any clearly identifiable general tax rule and thus not Tax Subsidies in
our classification) that materially affect economic decisions in a manner that
imposes substantial efficiency costs.”260 In this way, while the new approach
“cover[ed] much the same ground”261 as the predominant approach, it de-
fined tax expenditures without “relying on a hypothetical ‘normal’ tax.”262 In
theory, this alternative methodology would solidify the concept of tax ex-
penditures by requiring the JCT to identify the general rule from which any
given provision identified as a tax subsidy (and hence a tax expenditure)
departs. In reality, however, “[c]ountless sets of rules can be characterized as
the general rules of the current income tax, with other rules constituting the
exceptions.”263 This problem emerges when one tries to determine whether
tax relief for working childcare costs should be characterized as a tax
subsidy.
256. Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 110th Cong., A Reconsideration of Tax
Expenditure Analysis 1 (2008).
257. Id. (“The two categories together cover much the same ground as does the current
definition of tax expenditures, and in some cases extend the application of the concept further.
The revised approach does so, however, without relying on a hypothetical ‘normal’ tax to
determine what constitutes a tax expenditure, and without holding up that ‘normal’ tax as an
implicit criticism of present law. The result should be a more principled and neutral approach
to the issues.”).
258. See id. at 12 (classifying the distinction between debt and equity as a Tax-Induced
Structural Distortion but “not a tax expenditure (Tax Subsidy) in the narrow sense, because
there is no clear consensus as to what general rule of tax law, if any, the debt-equity distinction
might violate”). Other examples provided were the deferral of foreign earnings earned through
foreign corporations and the capital gains preference. Id. at 10, 22.
259. Id. at 9.
260. Id. at 41.
261. Id. at 39.
262. Id.
263. Thuronyi, supra note 190, at 1185 (“These problems with developing a set of objec-
tive general rules, as well as the absence of criteria for distinguishing ‘special’ from ‘general’
rules, show that the general/special dichotomy is as arbitrary and subjective as an ideal income
tax.”).
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Section 61 of the Code provides the general rule that “gross income
means all income from whatever source derived.”264 Thus, one might argue
that all exclusions from gross income constitute deviations from that all-
important section.265 The Joint Committee on Taxation took this approach
during the couple of years in which it utilized its alternative formulation of
tax expenditures.266 Specifically, in 2008 and 2009, the JCT characterized a
variety of exclusions as “Tax Subsidies,” including the exclusion for “em-
ployer-provided health care,”267 and “miscellaneous fringe benefits,”268 along
with § 129’s FSA exclusion and § 21’s credit.269 It explained as follows:
All employee compensation is subject to tax unless the Code contains a
specific exclusion for the income. Specific exclusions for employer-pro-
vided benefits include the following: coverage under accident and health
plans, accident and disability insurance, group term life insurance, educa-
tional assistance, tuition reduction benefits, transportation benefits (park-
ing, van pools, bicycles, and transit passes), dependent care assistance,
adoption assistance, meals and lodging furnished for the convenience of
the employer, employee awards, and other miscellaneous fringe benefits
(e.g., employee discounts, services provided to employees at no additional
cost to employers, and de minimis fringe benefits).270
Thus, it seems that the JCT simply lumped § 129’s FSA exclusion with a
variety of exclusions properly characterized as “Tax Subsidies” because those
provisions carve out exceptions to § 61’s general rule that gross income is
income derived from all sources, that is, by exempting various otherwise
includible items from being taxable;271 and with § 129 so-pegged, § 21’s
264. I.R.C. § 61 (2012).
265. Thuronyi, supra note 190, at 1158.
266. For instance, in its 2008 Report the JCT explains as follows:
The exclusion from gross income for employer-provided health care benefits is an excep-
tion to the Code’s general rule that all compensation for services constitutes gross in-
come. The value of health care benefits that an employer provides to its employees
constitutes gross income to each employee in this general sense. Fringe benefits are in-
cluded in an employee’s gross income unless specifically excluded under a provision in
the Code. For this reason, the provisions that exclude employer-provided health care
benefits from income are exceptions to the general rule and are Tax Subsidies under our
revised classification.
2008–2012 Estimates, supra note 244, at 15 (footnotes omitted).
267. The JCT cited exclusions for employer-provided healthcare as an example of a Social
Spending Tax Subsidies, explaining that this exclusion “can be traced back to the 1940’s, when
employers offered fringe benefits in order to attract labor in a period of tight wage controls.”
Id.
268. Id. at 38.
269. Id.
270. Id. (footnote omitted).
271. A closer look at the JCT’s 2008 and 2009 reports further suggests that the working
childcare tax relief provisions may have been improperly characterized as “Tax Subsidies.” The
JCT listed these provisions under “Social Spending,” one of three sub-categories of “Tax Subsi-
dies.” Id. at 55; see also 2009–2013 Estimates, supra note 244, at 41. The JCT defined its newly
created sub-category of “Social Spending” provisions as those “Tax Subsidies related to the
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mirror credit provision became inevitably attached.272
But as the analysis in Part III reveals, there are far better ways to view
the tax relief provided by §§ 21 and 129. Specifically, §§ 21 and 129, like
many other sections of the Code, provide necessary tax relief (however inad-
equate) for the costs of earning income. In other words, these sections are
not exceptions to any general rule at all but instead create their own first-
order rules. This view is consistent with the legislative history of § 21 dis-
cussed in Part I. Furthermore, it has been embraced by the Treasury Depart-
ment in its Tax Expenditure Estimate Reports discussed in the next Section,
which fulfill the department’s own responsibilities under CBICA.
3. Treasury’s Tax Expenditure Model
Initially, the Treasury Department identified tax expenditures by em-
ploying a model very similar to the JCT’s predominant model. Specifically,
Treasury identified tax expenditures as tax provisions that departed from a
“normal tax” and defined normal tax in the same way as the JCT. Thus, at
first, there was little disparity between the tax expenditure lists of the JCT
and Treasury.273
In 1983, however, Treasury began to use a different model that is quite
similar to the alternative model used by the JCT. Treasury exclusively used
this methodology in both 1983 and 1984.274 Starting in 1985, apparently
concerned that having its estimates differ substantially from those of the JCT
supply of labor” and those “intended to subsidize or induce behavior unrelated to the produc-
tion of business income.” 2008–2012 Estimates, supra note 244, at 6. It is not clear for which
of these two reasons the JCT placed working childcare tax relief provisions in the “Social
Spending” bucket, but it does not appear to belong in either. As explained in Part II, the
legislative history of § 21 is quite different, emphasizing the percentage credit as a mechanism
for providing a deduction equivalent for the cost of earning income. It is also possible that the
JCT just made an error and characterized tax relief for working child care as a cost “unrelated
to the production of business income”—the other way to earn a place in the “Social Spending
category.” Id. at 6. This characterization is blatantly incorrect given the plain language of the
Tax Code. Section 21 states that the percentage credit allowed only applies to “employment-
related expenses” defined as “amounts paid for the following expenses, but only if such ex-
penses are incurred to enable the taxpayer to be gainfully employed.” I.R.C. § 21 (2012). Sec-
tion 129 limits the amounts that may be excluded from income by being diverted into an FSA
to these same expenses. Id. § 129.
272. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
273. Prior to 1983, Treasury’s listing of “tax expenditures”—labeled Special Analysis G—
generally matched those published by the CBO and the JCT. This close correspondence of tax
expenditure lists resulted because the concept of a “normal” tax used by both executive branch
and congressional staffs was a variant of a comprehensive income tax, albeit with several major
exceptions, that had not deviated significantly from the concept used in the first tax expendi-
ture listings. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Special Analyses, Budget of the United
States Government, FY 1985, at G-1, http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/usspa/
Specanalyses_1985.pdf [http://perma.cc/5GC2-M983] [hereinafter 1985 Budget].
274. See id.; Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Special Analyses, Budget of the United
States Government, Fiscal Year 1984, at G-11, http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publica-
tions/usspa/Specanalyses_1984.pdf [http://perma.cc/FRY4-GJQF] [hereinafter 1984 Budget].
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might cause confusion,275 it began to publish two lists of tax expenditures in
its required reports—one using this methodology and one using the JCT’s
predominant methodology, which focused on deviations from the “normal”
tax.”276
Under the Treasury’s alternative model, for a tax provision to be charac-
terized as a tax expenditure two conditions must be satisfied:
—The provision must be “special” in that it applies to a narrow class of
transactions or taxpayers; and
—There must be a “general” provision to which the “special” provision is a
clear exception.277
General provisions were defined as those provisions that were part of
the Treasury’s so-called reference tax.278 According to Treasury, these refer-
ence tax provisions provide “structural features [that] must be dealt with in
some manner in order to have an operational income tax. . . . [By contrast,]
it would be possible to have a fully operational income tax that did not
contain any of the special provisions that give rise to tax subsidies.”279 Using
these concepts, Treasury defines its reference tax to include the following:
the definition of income subject to tax and allowable deductions, including
cost recovery for depreciable assets; taxable units and their threshold levels
of taxability; . . . the schedule of tax rates; the basic tax accounting rules,
including the accounting period for taxation and whether income is taxed
as it is realized or as it accrues.280
As discussed above, the JCT used a similar methodology to conclude
that §§ 21 and 129 were tax expenditure provisions, apparently believing
that these provisions, like the exclusion for fringe benefits and employer-
provided healthcare, represent a deviation from the general rule in § 61 that
gross income is income from whatever source derived. Treasury, however,
reached an opposite conclusion, using a virtually identical test.
Treasury agreed with the JCT that many exclusions, like the exclusion
for fringe benefits, constitute deviations from the general rule that all wages
must be taxed.281 It, however, did not believe that the working childcare
275. 1985 Budget, supra note 273, at G-5 (“Neither the Congressional Budget Office nor
the Joint Committee on Taxation adopted these revisions. Those offices continued to use a
modified income tax ‘norm,’ as described above, as the basis for identifying tax expenditures.
As a consequence, Special Analysis G in the 1983 and 1984 budgets did not fully correspond to
other ‘tax expenditure budgets,’ a condition some have found confusing.”).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at G-1.
279. 1984 Budget, supra note 274, at G-1.
280. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Budget of the United States Government, 1983:
Special Analysis G, at 4, http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/usspa/Spe-
canalyses_1983.pdf [http://perma.cc/RHT5-7QCQ].
281. Id. (“The inclusion of wages in the tax base is a clear example of reference tax struc-
ture, just as the exclusion of fringe benefits is due to special provisions, and therefore clearly
constitute tax subsidies.”). On the other hand, Treasury did not believe that the exclusion for
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credit belonged in this category and instead believed it was primarily a cost
of earning income. It wrote: “in the absence of the credit, expenses for child
and dependent care would be deductible as employee business expenses.”282
Thus, for Treasury, the only portion of § 21’s percentage credit (and by ex-
tension § 129’s FSA exclusion) that constituted a tax expenditure was the
“the excess of the value of the credit over the value of a deduction.”283 Of
course, because §§ 21 and 129 only allow the equivalent of a deduction for a
fraction of actual working childcare expenses, in almost all situations, this
excess will not exist.
Given the multiple methodologies used by the JCT and Treasury to
identify tax expenditures and the fact that the JCT and Treasury reached
inconsistent conclusions even when using almost identical methods, it is un-
surprising that scholars have also weighed in on how to best separate tax
expenditure provisions from other provisions of the Code.
4. Academic Tax Expenditure Models
As discussed in Section IV.A, when Surrey first developed the idea of tax
expenditures, he hoped that lawmakers would recognize that certain provi-
sions of the Code are not tax provisions at all but operate as, and thus could
be substitutes for, direct spending programs.284 As a result, some scholars
have argued that tax expenditure analysis should be brought back to these
roots.285
In his influential work,286 Seymour Fiekowsky argues that a provision
should not be classified as a tax expenditure provision unless it is “possible
to formulate an expenditure program administrable by a cognizant govern-
ment agency that would achieve the same objective at equal, higher, or lower
budgetary cost[ ].”287 Professor Thuronyi formulates a similar “sub-
stitutability” test for classifying tax expenditures that “involves two steps: (1)
identifying a provision’s significant purposes, and (2) determining whether
a nontax program can serve those purposes at least as well.”288 Professors
gifts was a special rule and instead was a general rule. Id. at 6. This is one of the only ways in
which the Treasury’s reference tax base differs from the JCT’s reference tax base. This has no
effect on the subject of this Article.
282. Id. at 24.
283. Id.
284. See supra Section IV.A.
285. Thuronyi, supra note 190, at 1186 (“The chief purpose of tax expenditure analysis
should be to facilitate the replacement of tax expenditures with non-tax-based programs and
to guide budgetary choices between tax-based and non-tax-based assistance.”).
286. Cited by JCT and Treasury in formulating alternative methodologies. In practice,
Treasury does not use prong two. See Edward D. Kleinbard, Chief of Staff, Joint Comm. on
Taxation, Rethinking Tax Expenditures 8 (May 1, 2008), http://www.jct.gov/Rethink-
ing_Tax_Expenditures.pdf [http://perma.cc/TP7K-AXRS] (building on Fiekowsky’s work on
tax subsidies).
287. Seymour Fiekowsky, The Relation of Tax Expenditures to the Distribution of the “Fiscal
Burden”, 2 Can. Tax’n 211, 215 (1980).
288. Thuronyi, supra note 190, at 1186.
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Weisbach and Nussim have more recently argued that tax expenditure analy-
sis should simply focus on whether the objectives of a particular tax expen-
diture could best be achieved through a direct spending program or through
a tax program.289
Could the objectives, in Fiekowsky’s words, and the “significant pur-
poses,” in Thuronyi’s, of § 21’s percentage credit and § 129’s FSA exclusion
be accomplished through a direct spending program? Congressional pur-
poses are not always easy to discern, and when discernable may be very
mixed. In the case of § 21, and by extension the case of § 129, however,
Congress was rather clear—working childcare expenses were seen as costs of
earning income and allowing tax relief for these costs seen as necessary to
calculating tax. Congress did not, by contrast, mean to serve other nontax
purposes, such as encouraging procreation or mothers to work. Thus, the
question of whether a nontax program could serve as an adequate substitute
for §§ 21 and 129 must be answered in the negative. These sections have the
tax-related purpose of compensating working parents for the costs of child-
care that enable them to earn income and should not be classified as tax
expenditure provisions.
Considering the preceding discussion, it is quite clear that the JCT has
long mischaracterized §§ 21 and 129 as tax expenditure provisions—that is,
“provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemp-
tion, or deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a
preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.”290 As a result, provisions
providing tax relief for working childcare costs should be removed from
future tax expenditures lists. This would help prevent the current tax laws
from being misunderstood as they have been in the past and help protect the
progress that Congress would make if it were to adopt the reforms suggested
in this Article.291
Conclusion
Just as all families look different from one another, the ways in which
families earn income and care for their children vary dramatically. In two-
parent families, one parent may earn all of the income while the other pro-
vides childcare; alternatively, both parents may work. And in single-parent
families, one parent may alone bear the primary responsibilities of earning
income and caring for her children. But unlike the first family, dual-earner
289. David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs,
113 Yale L.J. 955, 976 (2004).
290. Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 3(3), 88 Stat. 297, 299 (1974) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§ 622(3) (2012)).
291. Alternatively, costs such as business-related meal, entertainment, and moving ex-
penses should be added to the JCT’s list. If the latter approach is insisted on, the text of the
JCT reports should highlight the ambiguities of making this characterization to underscore to
future lawmakers that the tax relief provided by these provisions should be limited with
greater care than the relief provided by provisions that are clearly best characterized as tax
expenditures.
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and single-parent families are exceedingly likely to incur significant addi-
tional expenses to provide childcare while at work.
Currently, §§ 21 and 129 of the Internal Revenue Code treat the child-
care costs working parents incur as personal expenses, subject to various
dollar limitations, percentage limits, and phaseouts. Once these limitations
are applied, working parents will receive tax relief for only a small fraction of
the childcare costs they incur. This Article shows that this is inappropriate as
a matter of fundamental tax policy and that working childcare expenses
should be treated as nonconsumptive costs of earning income.
Having determined that the tax relief provided by §§ 21 and 129 is inad-
equate, this Article encourages lawmakers to be careful when choosing an
avenue of reform. It might, for instance, seem sufficient to provide first aid
to current laws by simply altering their overly severe limits. But while this
would be a step in the right direction, it would continue to leave the tax laws
vulnerable to the same legislative dysfunction that allowed the tax relief pro-
vided to working families to become so inadequate in the first place. This
Article instead urges lawmakers to provide parents the opportunity to de-
duct working childcare costs under the same methods as other costs of earn-
ing income, which are generally not subject to stringent limitations. In doing
so, this Article suggests meaningful reform of the Internal Revenue Code
that will help prevent the overtaxation of the modern working family. To be
sure, the tax laws cannot (and should not) solve all problems facing today’s
working parents. The reforms proposed in this Article, however, could at
least ease their economic struggles.
